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ABSTRACT
THE LEFT OF CENTER POLITICS IN TURKEY:
THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY 1965-1980
Ahmet Metin Oktay
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Ergun Özbudun
August 1998
This thesis analyzes the left of center politics implemented by the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) in Turkey from 1965 to 1980 in an emprical and historical 
context. The adoption of left of center stance, the attendant conceptual 
confusion, the unceasing intra-party competition for power, the social democratic 
discourse and certainly the elections and the electorate will be discussed along 
with domestic and foreign affairs as well as the socioeconomic transformation of 
the particular period.
Keywords: Left of Center, Social Democracy, Intra-Party Competition, 
Conceptual Confusion, Socioeconomic Changes.
IV
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE MERKEZ SOL; 
CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ 1965-1980
Ahmet Metin Oktay
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Jeremy Salt
Ağustos 1998
Bu çalışma, 1965-1980 yılları arasında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) ‘nin 
izlediği merkez sol çizgisini tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde, ceryan etmiş politik, 
sosyal ve ekonomik olayları değerlendirerek ele almıştır. Merkez sol çizginin 
kabulu ve bunu takip eden kavram kargaşası, parti içi süregelen çekişmeler, 
sosyal demokrat hareket ve kuşkusuz seçimler ve seçmenlerin analizi, iç ve dış 
meseleler ve dönemin sosyo-ekonomik gelişmeleri esas alınarak incelenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Merkez Sol, Sosyal Demokrasi, Parti-içi Çekişmeler, 
Kavramsal Kargaşa, Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişmeler
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Turkish political system, neither completely absorbed by democratic 
challenges, nor released from its smothering embrace, welcomed the left of 
center movement under the auspices of the Republican People’s Party 
(RPP) in the midst of the 1960s. With the transition to multi-party 
democracy, it would be nearly impossible to believe that our political life, 
characterized by the long struggle for democracy, would remain unaffected 
in the face of the various political movements of democracy. The left of 
center movement within the RPP progressed in gradual phases. The first 
phase was adopting the left of center slogan in the hope of bringing a new 
identity, which was hoped to appeal to the voters. The second phase was 
the acknowledgement of the left of center line to legitimize the slogan and to 
end the intra-party conflict of the movement. The last phase was the 
consolidation of the new stance with the change of the ossified party 
leadership, wtiich was believed to represent and contain the opposition 
hampering the progress of the left of center line among both the Republicans 
and the electorate.
However, these phases hosted a series of tumultuous opposition 
stands, \A/hich had to be overcome. The left of center movement created an 
intellectual conflict, coupled with the widespread confusion, yet to be 
resolved today. The confusion, characterized by hesitation to associate the
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Republicans with the left of center line, mainly stemmed from the disputable 
meaning of the movement on which little was done to elaborate.
Despite all the efforts to identify the RPP with a reformist and social 
democratic character strictly loyal to the principles of democracy on a unified 
and effective left of center line, the Republican appeal continued to dwindle. 
In the face of a seriously diminishing political appeal among the electorate, 
the Republicans underwent a series of reformist efforts to revive the 
founding spirit of the RPP and bring back the glory of the 1920s. Until the 
early 1970s, however, almost' every effort proved futile bringing about 
tumultuous intra-party conflict and undesirable electoral defeats. Going into 
the 1970s, the RPP acquired the long-desired momentum and came out 
triumphant in the 1973 and 1977 General Elections polling 33.3 percent and 
41.1 percent of the vote respectively.
The Second Chapter studies the period of the birth of the left of 
center in 1965 to its consolidation in 1972. It purports to enlighten the 
discernable pattern, which made the left of center politics weak and 
fragmented until 1972, and brings to light the significant events which left 
their mark on the character of today’s left of center politics.
The rise of the left of center on a social democratic discourse started 
with the 1973 General Elections. In order better to examine the particular 
political phenomenon, v^ich marked the beginning of the high tide of left of 
center politics, one must, above all, understand the social, economic, and 
political factors that brought about this historical episode. The aim of the 
Third Chapter, therefore, is to throw light on the process in which the left of
center reached its culmination. The chapter elucidates the question of what 
actually contributed to the rise of the Republican votes through analyzing the 
1973 General Elections, as well as the party program and policies. To that 
end, it examines the sociopolitical reasons that led the Republicans to adopt 
a social democratic nature in a perplexing revisionist manner, as well as the 
socioeconomic factors that promoted the upsurge of the social democratic 
ideology in Turkey. Furthermore, the post-election days, vWiich comprised 
the long-drawn-out negotiations for a government, and domestic and foreign 
issues that shaped the political atmosphere of the decade, are examined to 
provide a broader picture to better understand how the RPP increased its 
electoral appeal.
The Fourth Chapter focuses on evaluating the development of the left 
of center politics from the glamorous days of the 1977 until the unavoidable 
fall towards the end of the decade. It aims to underline the factors that 
caused the Republicans to abandon their social welfare policies and recent 
electoral base as suddenly and dramatically as their remarkable rise to the 
top. Finally, the focus is shifted to clarify the reasons as to why the left of 
center depleted its electoral power. The continuous intra-party competition 
for power, the repeated amendments of the party statute and the mid-term 
elections of 1979, as well as the domestic economic situation of the period, 
are also examined in order to come up with sound arguments to explain the 
unprecedented fall of the votes of the left of center.
It bears repeating that one cannot understand Turkish politics 
without a grasp of the Turkish left of center tradition, \Miich took shape in the
1970s, and, consequently, the narrative now turns to a closer examination of 
the nature of this ideology and its historical account in Turkey.
CHAPTER II
THE BIRTH OF LEFT OF CENTER
2.1. The Republican People’s Party Adopts the Left of Center 
Slogan
The political expression of ‘left of center’ first appeared in Turkish politics 
shortly before the 1965 general elections as the slogan of the 
Republican People’s Party (RPP). İsmet İnönü, the party leader, 
explained the new party position for the first time in a speech on 28 July 
1965, which was published the next day in the Milliyet daily.^ However, 
its roots date back to a few day-long talks between İnönü and ismaii 
Rüştü Aksal, the Secretary-General of the RPP, on Heybeli Island, 
before the 1961 elections.^
It is a well-known fact that the majority of people perceived the 
RPP, whether in government or opposition, as a state party far from 
being progressive. The past of the party did not prove to be an 
advantage either. In addition to its pro-status quo image over the years, 
the RPP seemed to remain in a position that supported the 1960 military 
intervention in the hope of increasing its overall popularity. The left of
 ^ Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye [The Turkish 
Experiment in Democracy] 1945-1980, trans. Ahmet Fethi (İstanbul: Hil 
Yayın, 1996), 247.
 ^Metin Toker, İnönü’nün Son Başbakanlığı [İnönü’s Last 
Primeministership] 1961-1965 {Ar\kara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 234.
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center slogan, this new political expression, was adopted in the hope 
that it would bring a new identity to the party, thus appealing to the 
voters. At that time, however, adopting the ‘left of center’ slogan did not 
actually focus on moving left of center and changing the ideology and the 
program accordingly; rather, it was more like defining the old views with 
new phrases.^ It was shortly before the general elections of 10 October 
1965 that İnönü and his staff defined the party stance as left of center. 
There was not enough time for the members of the party to fully 
understand the meaning of this new position, let alone internalize it and 
then clearly present it to public opinion for approval. Coupled with its 
lack of acceptance and understanding among party members, there was 
a very sensitive connotation to overcome in the expression of left of 
center. Ever since the beginning of the secularist movement led by the 
Republicans in the early days of the republic, the opponents of 
secularism had tried to portray the movement as being hostile to Islam 
and as being a preliminary to establishing communism in Turkey. The 
RPP, standing for Kemalist principles, was long attacked for being pro- 
Communist by the partisans of Islam who believed Kemalism to be 
irreligious." It was, therefore, very important to assure the public that 
being left of center did not mean being communist. However, the 
members of the RPP, unable to fully appreciate the new party ideology.
 ^Ayşe G. Ayata, CHP: örgüt ve İdeoloji [RPP; Organization and 
Idelogy] (Ankara; Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), 82.
" Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London; I.B. Tauris & 
Co. Ltd., 1993), 264.
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were not prepared to deal with the possibility of the Justice Party (JP) 
placing the left of center line in the same category as communism in their 
election campaign.
2.2. The Left of Center Slogan in the 1965 General Elections
It was not long after the introduction of the new political slogan that the 
Republicans realized the disputable connotations of the left of center 
slogan. The left of center slogan was immediately portrayed as the 
center of the left by the rival parties, which insinuated a communist 
nature. Therefore, even though the position of the party was defined as 
left of center and endorsed by party chairman İnönü, it was almost never 
strongly pronounced in the election campaign of 1965.® Only once did 
Bülent Ecevit, who served in İnönü’s administration as Minister of Labor 
in 1961, utter the left of center line on behalf of the RPP on the radio in 
an attempt to mobilize those voters who regarded the party as one of 
out-dated political pronouncements.®
Nevertheless, the new slogan did not profit the RPP in the 1965 
elections. Ahmad^ argues that, in the hope of weakening the growing 
appeal of the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), the Republicans had devised 
the left of center slogan; however, they underestimated the potential of 
its controversial meaning, which was cleverly manipulated with religious
Ahmad, Demokrasi. 248.
® Metin Toker, İsmet Paşa’nın Son Yılları [The Last Years of İsmet 
Pasha] 1965--/973 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 85.
 ^Ahmad, Demokrasi. 248.
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sentiments by mainly the Justice Party (JP). The JP won a landslide 
victory, gaining an absolute majority of both the popular votes cast and 
the parliamentary seats (See Appendix A). The Republican vote plummeted 
to 28.7 percent, the lowest since the 1950s, leading to long-lasting 
internal disputes.
2.3. Why did the Left of Center Slogan Fail in 1965?
The timing of the adoption of such a new and controversial slogan
created internal disquiet following the election defeat. The on-going 
debates within the RPP following the defeat aimed to identify the main 
reasons behind the election disappointment. Despite the fact that the 
RPP had adopted a new stance, as Zürcher states “it lacked credibility 
as a progressive-party, certainly with İnönü at the helm.”® Furthermore, 
along with the members of the party, the voters on the whole, could not 
fully understand this new movement of left of center. Nor did they really 
like the name, mainly due to the successful campaign of the JP, which 
kept up a constant harassment of the leftist movements. The new 
campaign slogan, as Kedourie argues, “enabled the Justice Party to tar 
the Republicans with the Communist brush.”® Süleyman Demirel, the JP 
chairman, exploited the theme of Islam, emphasizing the Islamic 
character of the party not only to assure supporters of the Democrats in 
provincial towns and countryside against accusations of freemasonry.
® Zürcher, Turkey. 265.
® Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 128.
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but also to hinder the Republican campaignfO During his election 
campaign, Demirel repeatedly declared: “Communism will not enter 
Turkey because our population is 98 percent Muslim” and that “Left of 
center is the road to Moscow and we are right of center and on the path 
to God.” °^ And in fact, it would be far-fetched for the Republicans to 
remain unaffected and to carry out a positive campaign with such a 
controversial slogan, the meaning of which was still a mystery in 1965. 
Therefore, it would not be mistaken to say that people could not identify 
the left of center slogan as the embodiment of their own hopes in 1965.
2.4. Disputing Proposals for the Future
With İnönü as party chairman, history repeated itself once more, bringing 
the RPP into the arms of election defeats, as in the 1950,1954, and 1957 
general elections. To some, it was İnönü and his failure to communicate 
in a way that would appeal to the general electorate that led to the 
election disappointment. To others, it was the new slogan, left of center. 
To the rest, it was a combination of both. It was interesting that the Akis 
magazine, known to favor İsmet İnönü, once published a headline soon 
after the 1965 elections depicting ever-growing concern at İnönü’s 
leadership of the RPP. It read that “İnönü has completed his last duty for 
the nation...” ’^ On October 15, the Milliyet newspaper made this headline
Kedourie, Politics. 128. 
”  Toker, İsmet 58.
an eye-catching first-page article, the impact of which had a devastating 
effect in the political arena.
Those sympathizers and members of the RPP resenting the 
goings-on of the party asserted three options. The first option was that 
İnönü would leave politics. Second, the left of center stance would be 
disowned. The third option was the combination of the first two.
As a matter of fact, İnönü himself started thinking about leaving 
the Turkish political arena. He made a series of consultative contacts 
with some top-level party members’ ,^ two of whom were Kemal Satır and 
Turhan Feyzioğlu. What follows is convincing evidence in his own words 
quoted from his personal diary, "Ece Muhtırasf’ÇThe Communiqué of the 
Queen):
20 October 1965: I told Kemal Satır that I was going to withdraw. He 
will talk with Ismail Rüştü Bey.
24 October 1965: I sent for Turhan at 18:00. Talked until 20:00. The 
issue of withdrawal. He understands the essence. Finds it detrimental 
to withdraw right away...^^
By the end of October 1965, it was certain that İnönü would retain 
his position as the party chairman. Thus, there was only one option left, 
seeming still somewhat practicable and absolutely necessary to the
Toker, İsmet. 58.
On various occasions, İnönü met with Kemal Satır, İsmail R. 
Aksal, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Nihat Erim, Ferit Melen, Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, 
Kemal Demir, Turan Şahin, İbrahim öktem, Nüvit Yetkin, Cihat Baban, 
Turan Güneş, İlyas Seçkin, Hüdai Oral, Muammer Erten, Tahsin Bekir 
Balta.
Toker, İsmet. 61.
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rising opposition of the left of center line within the party. The left of 
center stance had to be abandoned.
The majority of the Party Assembly asserted that left of center 
politics had not been clearly identified but emphasized the importance of 
the RPP’s sticking firmly with the left of center stance. On the other hand, 
a substantial centrist group opposed the left of center tactics and blamed 
the election defeat solely on the new ideology. This group maintained 
that moving left of center had been a wrong strategy to rely on. To the 
criticisms of the left of center stance, İnönü’s answer was crystal clear 
and quite determined: “It is not like we have just moved left of 
center...We, for the last forty years, have been following left of center 
policies.”’® It was evident that the RPP would carry on exactly as it had 
started off before the 1965 general elections and that its political 
ideology would remain left of center. After all, İnönü knew that getting rid 
of the left of center slogan would further undermine the trustworthiness of 
the RPP, whose recent past in this aspect had been rather shaky.’®
2.5. By-elections of the Senate in 1966
One-third of the Senate was to be re-elected in 1966. That meant 50 
new senators. Once again the Republicans had high hopes which can be 
attributed to the media resentment of the JP government six months after 
it assumed power. The article by Abdi İpekçi in Milliyet at the beginning 
of April 1966 was clearly portraying the overall frustration and
’® Toker, İnönü. 236.
16 Ahmad, Demokrasi. 250.
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disappointment in the eyes of key media figures.’  ^ Moreover, the 
general opinion was that the JP government would retrogress in the by- 
elections of the Senate. The election estimates in major newspapers 
were also supporting the general opinion. However, despite the media 
and the general opinion of the Republicans, the JP won 31 seats in the 
Senate as opposed to 13 seats by the RPP on September 16, 1966. 
What seems ironic is that despite the seeming approval of the left of 
center line within the party, mainly through İnönü’s influence, İnönü did 
not mention the left of center expression very much, primarily focusing 
on the high cost of living and the threat of growing radical Islamist 
movements during his campaign. The Senate elections campaign clearly 
showed that even İnönü was not comfortable with using the left of center 
tactics. Consequently, the overall confusion of the Republicans and the 
voters was revealed in the election results. The defeat led, inevitably, to 
acrimonious debates on the left of center movement within the party. The 
conservative side of the RPP based their assertions on the accusations 
of a socialist and even pro-Communist stance disguised in the name of 
left of center line. They believed that moving left of center would soon 
take the RPP into the grave. İnönü, recognizing the disputable meaning 
of left of center, and wishing to bring a healthy end to the growing 
controversies, stated: “We are on the left of center, but not Socialist. No
17 Toker, İnönü. 236.
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one opposes the left of center. We shall expound on the left of center 
line to the Turkish nation all together.”’®
However, this was not the last of internal dissension over the left 
of center movement. At the beginning of August 1966, it was again the 
first issue on the agenda, the left of center movement. This time the 
opposition was not completely against the left of center ideology. 
However, they insisted that being a new movement, left of center needed 
a new name. This new name would assume full responsibility to defend, 
explain and spread the left of center line. The views of the opposition 
were outlined in a communiqué called "Arif Ertunga Muhtirasi"^^ (The 
communiqué of Arif Ertunga).
2.6. The 18“’ Party Congress: The Victory of the New Reformers
The 18“’ Party Congress staged a fierce competition not only for the
party leadership, but also for the General Secretariat. İnönü reasserted 
his position defeating Kasim Gülek by 929 to 230 votes.^° The 
polarization within the party became very clear during the election of the 
Secretary-General. There were two competing groups of opposing 
averments on the left of center stance. On one side was the group 
called the New Reformers led by Bülent Ecevit. They were resolute on 
the left of center line and insisted that the party ideology had to be 
defined as left of center at all costs. On the other side was the centrist-
Toker, İsmet 77.
’®lbid., 79.
Ahmad, Demokrasi. 251.
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group called the 75s (75’ler) led by Turhan Feyzioglu. They, on the 
contrary, maintained that the left of center ideology had to be abandoned 
and asserted that the centripetal readjustment of the party ideology was 
an absolute necessity. Unlike what the 75s claimed, the New Reformers 
tied the poor showing of the RPP in the previous elections to the internal 
disputes and hesitations about the left of center stance.^^ Bülent Ecevit 
and his men believed that adopting the left of center stance was just the 
departure the Republicans needed to appeal to the proletariat. As 
Kedourie mentions, Ecevit believed that “the party had for too long been 
identified with the Kemalist doctrine and with the bureaucratic style of 
government for so long obtained in Turkey.”^^  He considered the left of 
center as an ideology, which would allow the party to change its 
character in accordance with the socioeconomic changes of the period.^^ 
The 18*'’ party congress resulted in the election of Bülent Ecevit as 
the Secretary-General of the party, marking the approval of the left of 
center ideology by the majority of the Republicans.
Toker, İsmet. 80. 
Kedourie, Politics. 128. 
Ahmad, Demokrasi. 251.
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However, the victory of Ecevit’s group did not end the internal 
rivalry and conflicts; rather, it led the way to more severe disputes which 
reached their peak at the 4*^  Extraordinary Congress on 28 April 1967.
Feyzioglu and his supporters had taken control of the Senate and 
Parliament groups as well as setting up a group of eight people, known 
as the Ss^ “* (87er) mainly to provide a continuous opposition to the 
Secretary-General. However, the 8s did not remain contented with their 
opposition role and aimed at seizing control of the party. Feyzioglu 
declared that “the struggle within the RPP was between those who 
completely and whole-heartedly accept the congress decision [his 
faction] and those who desire to drive the party toward socialism 
[Ecevit’s group] or those who tolerate [inonu].” ®^ Following the
extraordinary congress, a seemingly centrist group of 48, 33 
representatives and 15 senators who objected to the left of center line, 
resigned from the RPP. To them, the RPP was on the wrong track, led 
by a pro-socialist leadership whose actions had not been properly 
contained.^® They later founded the Reliance Party to continue their 
political struggle, this time from outside.
The left of center movement created long-lasting infighting which, 
in turn, resulted in several splits and resignations. However, as
Turhan Feyzioğlu, Emin Paksüt, Orhan Öztrak, Ferit Melen, 
Turan Şahin, Coşkun Kırca, Süreyya Koç and Fehmi Alparslan were 
known to be the 8s.
Toker, İsmet. 96. 
Zürcher, Turkey. 266.
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özbudun argues, this “gave the RPP an ideologically more cohesive and 
homogenous leadership”^^  going into the 1970s.
2.7. Hopes Linger for the Left of Center
The by-elections of the Senate and the Parliament along with the local 
elections took place on 2 June 1968. The JP won all of the five 
parliamentary seats that were empty, along with 38 seats in the Senate. 
Meanwhile, the RPP won 13 seats in the Senate. Since the local 
elections were conducted at the same time with the by-elections of the 
Senate and the Parliament, each party using different methods regarded 
itself as the winner. As Toker^® suggests, the JP had progressed in six 
cities and regressed in 14, while the RPP lost power in 10 cities but was 
profitable in eight. The overall result was that the JP had increased its 
seats both in the Senate from 97 to 101 and in the Parliament from 256 
to 261, whereas the RPP had increased its number of senators from 30 
to 34 while maintaining its 95 seats in the Parliament. As for Bülent 
Ecevit, it was the victory of the left of center. Zürcher argues that “the 
improved share of the votes of the RPP in the big cities seemed to 
indicate that the new line was beginning to have an effect.” ®^ Moreover, 
the increased share of the Republican votes in urban areas, as Ahmad®°
Ergun Ozbudun, “Turkey” in Competitive Elections in Developing 
Countries, ed. Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun (Durham; Duke 
University Press, 1987), 347.
^®Toker, İsmet, 116. 
Zürcher, Turkey. 266.
30 Ahmad, Demokrasi. 256.
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argues, was very significant in that winning the majority of the rich 
Trakya {Thrace), Marmara, and Aegean regions, which were heavily 
urbanized, had been traditionally the key to winning the general 
elections. Whatever the case may be, although it was not a clear victory, 
it was definitely far from a disaster for the left of center.
2.8. Hopes Become Forlorn: The 1969 General Elections
The parliament changed the electoral law in 1969 (Law No. 1036) to
annul the national remainder system and to resume the original d’Hondt 
system. The RPP started its election campaign with the election 
manifesto: “We want authority from the people to establish a humane 
order, the RPP’s program of change of order.”^^  It was proposing a 
series of radical social reforms to include a land reform policy. Ecevit 
carried out most of the election campaign, making radical promises 
under the slogan, “land to those v\/ho cultivate it, water to those who use 
it.”“  Some landowners might have perceived this slogan as a threat to 
private property. In the meantime, İnönü and the conservative wing in 
the party were making moderate comments and less radical promises.“  
In a way, the campaign strategy of the party lacked harmony during the 
election campaign.
The 1969 General elections were the biggest disappointment, 
worse than that of 1965. The RPP acquired only 24.7 percent of the
Ayata, CHP. 84.
“  Ibid.
“  Ahmad, Demokrasi. 256.
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popular votes cast ('See Appendix A). However, due to the fact that the 
d’Hondt system favors the larger parties, the RPP improved its share of 
seats in the Parliament from 134 to 143.
The lack of harmony in the campaign strategy and the still 
ambiguous position of the Republicans on the left of center line 
contributed greatly to the election disaster in 1969. It was confusing for 
the voters; while “Ecevit and his supporters enthusiastically embraced 
the new orientation of the party, İnönü seemed to have second 
thoughts.”^  Besides deliberately making moderate speeches focused on 
the RPP’s Kemalist traditions, just before the elections, İnönü supported 
a motion in the parliament to grant the old members of the Democrat 
Party (DP) their political rights. He even arranged meetings of 
conciliation with Celal Bayar, the ex-DP leader, in the hope of attracting 
the old DP voters.^® However, such efforts could easily be considered as 
incongruous with the latest radical left of center campaign. The fall in 
the RPP vote, therefore, was most likely a result of the confusion and 
frustration of the voters that led to them punishing the RPP for its internal 
disagreements over the left of center stance.
2.9. The 1971 Military Ultimatum: Ecevit in Conflict with İnönü
In the early 1970s, Turkey was on the brink of serious disorder.
Demirel’s government hoped to revitalize the economy through deficit
Zürcher, Turkey, 266. 
Ahmad, Demokrasi. 256.
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finance and foreign loans which, in turn, instigated inflation.^® As a 
result, social discontents and stress got increasingly out of hand, with 
inevitable repercussions in the form of public disorder, starting initially in 
the universities. Not long after did the student revolts spread from the 
university campuses into the streets. Street demonstrations paved the 
way to fratricidal strife among the groups of students aligned with either 
extreme left or right wings. As Kedourie argues “political disorder 
ceased to be simply a matter of street demonstrations.”^^  Furthermore, 
Demirel’s government was manifestly powerless in stopping the agitation 
on the campuses and in the streets. In addition to its incompetence in 
curbing the increasing range and scope of violence, the JP government 
had also failed to get any legislation to carry out the social reforms 
provided for by the 1961 Constitution, the consequence of which was the 
attendant disquiet especially within the military.^®
Economic crises bred social violence. The combined effects of 
economic and social unrest led the high command of the Turkish armed 
forces handing Demirel an ultimatum on 12 March 1971. Although not a 
direct coup as in 1960, this was another intervention by the military
Kedourie, Politics. 129. 
"^Ibid., 130.
^  Clement H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy 
(Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1983), 15.
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aiming to end anarchy and to carry out social and economic reforms 
through forming “an above-party or technocratic government.”^^
Demirel’s immediate reaction to the ultimatum was resignation. 
Following his departure from the government, an enforced government 
was formed with Nihat Erim, a member of the conservative wing of the 
RPP, as Prime Minister. Despite İnönü’s earlier denouncement of the 
military’s interference in politics, he later gave support to the technocracy 
formed by Erim, once his close associate."“ In Ahmad’s"^  opinion, İnönü 
was aware that Erim could have possibly used his political influence to 
amass support for the conservative wing against the radicals led by 
Ecevit within the RPP. On the other hand, the RPP Secretary-General, 
Bülent Ecevit, announced that he would by no means support a 
government formed and backed by the military. He did not approve of 
the party’s affiliation with the military and its enforced government. 
Ecevit’s declaration clearly revealed his disagreement with İnönü. For 
the first time, he was challenging İnönü for what he believed in favor of 
the left of center ideology. Until 1971, İnönü had always supported 
Ecevit and his group and it was through İnönü’s patronage that Ecevit 
became a rising star. Who would have conceived that someday their
““ Ergun Özbudun, Turkey: Crises, Interreuptions, and 
Reequilibrations’’ in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing 
Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Symour 
Martin Lipset, n.p., 234.
"“ Zürcher, Turkey. 271.
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20
roads would part? Certainly, many people, as Ayata'’  ^ argues, held the 
opinion that İnönü represented the status quo and was the biggest 
obstacle against making radical changes in the RPP’s ideology. Moving 
left of center could not fully succeed in changing the popular image of 
the Republicans. Now it was time to go into changing the shop-window of 
the party. This meant changing the party leader, perhaps something 
over due. However, İnönü also symbolized the arduous struggle for 
democracy. The truth of the matter was that it would not be easy to 
contravene İnönü, especially while his advocates still dominated the 
party. Consequently, Ecevit resigned as Secretary-General. In a way, he 
could justify his resignation as the only way to save the left of center line 
in the eyes of the electorate, who were baffled to have seen the RPP 
realigning with the military and bureaucracy.'’  ^ The left of center ideology 
was now in the throes of serious confrontation. It was a choice between 
a vague and relatively moderate left of center stance in the patronage of 
the octogenarian İnönü and a more radical and fearlessly defined left of 
center line under the leadership of the energetic Ecevit.
2.10. The RPP Comes to A Crossroads: The 5’’’ Extraordinary 
Congress
In the ensuing days of his resignation, Ecevit turned towards the local 
branches of the party in search for support and managed to amass a
Ayata, CHP. 85.
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substantial amount, which enabled him to oppose the ossified realm of 
İnönü. In the meantime, seeing the large support for Ecevit in such big 
cities as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana, İnönü called for an 
extraordinary party congress in the hope of preventing Ecevit’s further 
lead in local party congresses. He also made it very clear that he would 
withdraw from politics if the congress happened to elect a party 
administration incongruous with his political views.'*'*
The 5**’ extraordinary party congress was planned to be held on 
May 5. However, due to a sudden health problem experienced by İnönü, 
it was postponed until the next day. May 6 witnessed a challenge 
between the past and the future. İnönü and Ecevit settled old scores 
with one another perhaps for the last time. İnönü stated that Ecevit was 
guiding the party in an unknown direction, making it an instrument for his 
dark ambitions.'*^ He played his last trump card by threatening once 
again that he would resign if the party administration, heavily dominated 
by Ecevit’s advocates, received the support of the majority.'*®
Despite all the conservative warnings, accusations of dark 
ambitions and more importantly, İnönü and what he had stood for, the 
party administration received a vote of confidence, marking the end of 
the realm of İnönü. İnönü resigned from the party he helped to found
"'* Ayata, CHP. 85.
'*® İsmail Cem, Tarih Açısından 12 MART [The Historical Account 
of 12 March] (İstanbul; Cem Yayınevi, 1978), 184.
'*® Ayata, CHP. 85.
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almost 50 years ago on May 7, 1972. His resignation cannot just be 
regarded as the overthrow of a political giant; rather, it was the end of an 
era seasoned with old traditions, one-man rule, and pro-status quo 
image.
In accordance with the 28*^  article of the party charter, another 
congress was convened on May 14 and elected Bülent Ecevit as the 
third party chairman of the RPP.'*^
The tumultuous 5*^  extraordinary party congress had been the 
platform for a confrontation between the past in the figure of İnönü and 
the future in the figure of Ecevit. As Cem suggests “yesterday cannot 
defeat today as the past cannot defeat the future,”"® and the future buied 
the past in history.
It suffices to say that the Republicans chose the more radical and 
fearlessly defined left of center line, ignored the old traditions and 
rejected the pro-status quo image of the party in the patronage of the 
octogenarian İnönü. Their choice marked the beginning of a new era, in 
which there was no longer any hesitation in associating the RPP with the 
left of center line. With Ecevit at the helm, the left of center meant the 
RPP and the RPP meant the left of center.
Toker, İsmet. 302. 
"®Cem, 12 Mart. 186.
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CHAPTER III
ECEVirS ERA
2.1. New Ideology in the Air: Social Democracy
Soon after Ecevit ousted İnönü from the chairmanship of the party and
increased his political leeway, he put the issue of a new party ideology 
on the agenda. The RPP was now undoubtedly on the left of the center 
of the political spectrum. However, the political discourse had to be 
clearly redefined in conformity with the left of center movement and with 
the needs of the 1970s. The RPP rephrased the party ideology as 
‘democratic left’ and joined the Socialist International, which opened for 
the Republicans the door to Social Democracy. With this epochal 
membership, the RPP was aiming to be a Social Democrat party with 
democratic left ideology on the left of the center of the political 
spectrum.'*®
Traditionally the social democrat parties had been distinguished 
by their emphasis on the middle and lower economic and social classes, 
in addition to their historical affiliation with the working class.®® With this 
in mind, the social democrat Republicans were to change their party 
base from the military and civilian bureaucracy, rich land owners in the
Ayata, CHP. 87.
David Caute, The Left in Europe: Since 1789 (London: BAS 
Printers Ltd., 1966), 229.
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countryside and influential business circles to the urban poor, the 
working class and the small Anatolian bourgeoisie. In doing that, 
however, the Republicans had no intention to identify the RPP with 
socialism; rather, they wished to establish a social democratic nature 
within the party. In Ecevifs opinion, social democracy was a flexible 
ideology in adapting to modern needs caused by recent socioeconomic 
changes.^^ After all, social democratic discourse could be used as a 
revisionist tool of social change to establish a social welfare state. 
“Social democracy’s great asset was its offer to bring about far-reaching 
improvements and to satisfy a rising gradient of expectations without 
occasioning significant disruptions in the lives of the ordinary people.”“
In a way, Turkey was not completely unfamiliar with social 
democracy. The 1960s had been the era of the social democrats in 
Western Europe. The upsurge of the popularity of social democracy had 
also reached Turkey in the late 1960s. The intellectuals had already 
welcomed the socialist pronouncements and supported the goals of 
social democracy through writing articles that promoted labor rights and 
political participation as well as a welfare state.“  The conditions that 
brought about the rise of social democracy in Western Europe in the
Ahmad, Demokrasi. 309.
“  Willie Thompson, The Left in History (London: Pluto Press, 
1997), 191.
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1960s were now present in Turkey. The rapidity of industrial and 
economic growth of the Western European nations in the 1960s had 
resulted in social dislocation, which, consequently, aggravated the social 
discontent of the people with their present governments. As Thompson®'* 
points out, the rise of class-consciousness, \A4iich was fostered by the 
gap between the living standards of the upper class and those of the 
middle and lower classes, had stimulated the support for the welfare 
programs of the social democratic parties in Western Europe. In this 
respect, rapid industrialization and high economic grov^h of the 1960s 
had increased the cost of living in Turkey deteriorating the living 
standards of the people throughout the country. In the early 1970s, it 
was obvious that Turkish people, on the whole, were not happy with their 
government.
Furthermore, the growing economies of Western European 
countries had created a high demand for labor; the lack of which 
generated a labor shortage. Consequently, it had produced “migration 
and demographic shifts, giving a multi-ethnic and multicultural character 
to European states.”®® The utmost outcome of labor shortage was that it 
stimulated not only a cultural awareness, but also an in-society 
antagonism. Those who suffered from cultural or ethnic segregation 
allied themselves with social democratic pronouncements. There was a
®^ Thompson, Left. 191.
®® Ibid.
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similar case in Turkey in the early 1970s. Drastic economic growth and
industrialization produced migration and demographic shifts. The flow of
rural workers to urban areas created an underprivileged class facing the
high cost of living and relentless competition for jobs in big cities. The
demographic shift created a new awareness among the multi-ethnic
urban poor who could be enticed by the promises of social democracy
such as social and economic reforms for justice and a welfare state.
Under these circumstances, the Republicans hoped that the majority of
the electorate would vote for the social democratic RPP, which now had
to prove itself to be the champion of the people. The Republicans did
not adopt social democratic discourse because they regarded it as a
chance to keep up with the latest trends of sociopolitical thought in the
Western world. Instead, the adoption of social democratic discourse was
aimed at immediate practical ends and was chartered by rapid
socioeconomic changes; rather than, by a well-defined long-term political
strategy. In the face of electoral volatility and discontent, it was,
arguably, a necessity for political survival. The majority of people hit by
the high cost of living were not content with their lives. Therefore, for
electoral purposes, the RPP had to approach to the majority of the
people in a way that would appeal to them. As Karpat clearly points out;
The survival of a political party in Turkey depends, in view of 
population still consisting of large groups of people with low living 
standards, on its ability to formulate its program in accordance 
with the basic needs of the largest social group.^®
“  Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi- 
Party System (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1966), 457.
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However, there was something that the Republicans had overlooked. 
When a political tradition is created, it is essential to make clear what is 
actually being followed; not only a mode of thought or set of practices, 
but also a contemporary reality in search of legitimacy.®^ With this in 
mind, the Republicans should have thoroughly examined the origin and 
principles of social democracy in order to fully understand and correctly 
explain the role that the RPP, under the leadership of Ecevit, was 
determined to assume. Without clear conceptual understanding of the 
ideology, the new political discourse could, in the long run, create further 
alienation of the voters dismayed that social democracy did not turn out 
to be what they thought. As it is well known by now, the conceptual 
confusion had hampered the overall performance of the Republicans, 
both breaching intra-party harmony and appalling the voters. As 
Sassoon points out, “in politics it is very often the case that an 
apparently nominalistic dispute, over a certain slogan, a symbol, a word, 
a controversy leaves outsiders baffled as to its meaning.”®® Therefore, 
the RPP of the 1970s was not conceptually prepared to create a new 
political tradition and was doomed to get lost in search of legitimacy in 
the eyes of the voters who could define social democracy based on their 
own needs.
®^ Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism (London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1996), 22.
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3.2. The 1973 General Elections
The unofficial election campaigns had started in as early as the fall of 
1972 with Demirel’s JP as the favorite winner of the upcoming elections. 
Yet, due to the martial law, which was lifted only three weeks before the 
elections, official election campaigns had been subject to various 
constraints including duration. Despite all the prohibitions and 
restrictions, nearing the election date, it turned out that there was a 
growing chance for Ecevit’s RPP to defeat Demirel’s JP.®® However, the 
main question was whether either party would poll enough to win an 
absolute majority, for Turkey urgently needed political stability and 
economic regularity. To the dismay of the many, the elections of 
October 1973 produced a complicated parliamentary arithmetic with 
seven parties represented in the Assembly, none having won an 
absolute majority fSee Appendix A). This arithmetical composition thus 
made coalition or minority governments inescapable.
The RPP emerged as the strongest party with 185 seats, polling 
33.3% of the popular vote. The Reliance Party (RP) with the votes 
siphoned off from the RPP could only poll 5.3 percent. After many years 
of electoral disappointments, the Republicans were able to constitute the 
largest group in the assembly with 41 percent of the parliamentary seats. 
They were bound to fail in forming a government of their own, however.
On the other hand, the votes on the right were severely 
fragmented vy/hile the JP lost nearly 16 percent of its gain in the previous
59 Ahmad, Demokrasi. 316.
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general elections and peripheral minor parties gathered relatively
significant support. It was in a way an election defeat for Demirel’s party
as it had obtained 46.5 percent of the votes cast in 1969. The Justice
Party this time gained only 149 seats with 29.8 percent of the popular
vote. The Democrat Party, founded in 1970 by the dissidents from the
JP. received 45 seats with just under 12 percent of the votes. Erbakan’s
National Salvation Party (NSP), successor to the National Order Party
which had been dissolved by court order in 1972, obtained 49 seats in
the Assembly. Moreover, the neofascist Nationalist Action Party (NAP)
under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, a key ex-military figure in the
1960 military coup, entered the Parliament with 3.4 percent of the
popular vote. The increased support for the National Salvation and
National Action parties was not solely associated with their emphasis on
rightist strands that mobilized the national sentiment and the hatred of
the West. As Dodd points out, it was also partly due to the:
Small traders’ and the small businessmen’s distress at the 
economic effects of big business, the fear of the incipient power of 
the unions, dislike for arrogant and unhelpful bureaucracy, and 
the close attachment to Islam.“
Moreover, the proportional representation practiced in the elections 
certainly assisted in increasing the number of parliamentary contingents 
of these two parties, the NSP and the NAP. It is therefore arguable that 
these two parties would not have gained seats under a majority or semi­
majority system.
“  Clemet H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey. 
(Beverely: The Eothen Press, 1979), 109.
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3.3. Post-Election Arguments:
Despite the fact that the recent percentage of votes of the RPP were still 
below those of the elections of the 1950s, the Republican votes had in 
fact risen by over one million since the 1969 elections, marking about a 
six percent increase.®  ^The electoral result of the 1973 elections brings in 
the question of what actually caused the upsurge of the Republican 
votes. The ideology had been and still was the left of center. Some 
might argue that it was the change of leadership and the new image that 
made all the difference. Others might claim that the ideology was better 
upheld following the change of leadership within the party. Furthermore, 
the rest might attribute the electoral increase simply to the fragmentation 
of the conservative votes. It seems clear that the rise in the RPP vote is 
closely associated with all the above arguments while the extent of 
contribution of each remains a matter of speculation. However, a further 
look into the socioeconomic changes of the period as well as the new 
party policy may give us a broader picture to better understand how the 
RPP increased its electoral appeal in 1973.
3.4. Socioeconomic Changes and the Republicans
From 1963 to 1971, Turkish industry grew at an approximate yearly rate
of nine percent.®  ^The economic boom and industrialization of the 1960s, 
coupled with rapid population growth, had an extensive impact on the
Hakan Tartan, Son Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [The Last 
Republican People’s Party] (Ankara; Verso Yayıncılık, 1992), 8.
Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, trans, and ed. 
Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye [Turkey in Transition] (Istanbul: Beige 
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socioeconomic structure of the 1970s. The emergence of homegrown 
industry generated a serious labor recruitment drive. Newly emerging 
industrial sectors had an acute labor shortage in big cities such as 
İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana. Furthermore, agriculture became 
more automated and those people who afforded the machinery 
increased their wealth significantly. On the other hand, farm laborers 
were left with no option but shift into industry or service. The emergence 
of automation in agriculture disturbed power relationships and social 
systems in the countryside. As a result, Turkey in the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s staged a much larger scale migration from the countryside to 
the big cities than in the 1950s. “Between 1960 and 1970, the city 
population of Turkey increased by five million, reaching 39 percent of the 
total population.”®^ The migrants, resentful of a lack of opportunities in 
agriculture and enticed by the attraction of the new industries, moved to 
big cities in search for greater economic opportunities. Unfortunately, as 
Zürcher points out, “only a minority of the migrants found regular work in 
the new industries.”®'* The majority had to do low-paid menial work 
without any social security or they worked in temporary jobs. The 
migration phenomenon introduced a new awareness of the city life and 
its natural complications in the eyes of those who had left their ancestral 
villages. The new dwellers had to live in the outskirts of the big cities, 
the shantytowns of Gecekondu (literally, 'built at night). The inhabitants
®® Schick, Türkiye. 64.
®'* Zürcher, Turkey. 283.
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of the gecekondu neighborhoods were deprived of any kind of 
infrastructure; nevertheless, their number increased at an uncontrollable 
pace. The city life was harsh and certainly the gecekondus did not make 
it any easier. As ZCircher points out, the people in the shantytowns were 
“upwardly mobile and integration oriented” and they made “quite use- of 
the competition between the parties before elections to extract 
promises.”®^ As the number of low-income neighborhoods continued to 
grow in big cities, the electoral importance of these areas grew to be 
substantial.
Consequently, the RPP shifted its electoral appeal to urban lower 
classes and to the more modern sectors of the peasantry. This meant 
that the RPP had changed its social bases of electoral support. In 
return, the low-income groups, troubled by the high cost of living in urban 
areas, welcomed the welfare state policy and became increasingly 
interested in the pronouncements of the Republican left of center 
ideology which capitalized on class based appeals. “The urban poor 
mostly wanted practical social welfare more than the promises of total 
change forecast by new ideologies.”®® As for the more modern sectors of 
the peasantry, rural development increased the appeal among the 
villagers towards the RPP’s social reform program.
®® Zürcher, Turkey. 283.
®® Dodd, Democracy. 133.
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Since rural development entailed the commercialization of 
agriculture, the transformation of share-croppers into wage 
laborers, and an increasing inequality of income, it [was] 
especially in those developed villages that the potential for class 
voting and issue-oriented politics was greatest.
Ozbudun is of the opinion that the RPP’s rise was due to “changes in the
social characteristics of the electorate.”®® The voters became mainly
concerned with concrete benefits in return for their votes. They came to
“perceive competitive elections as a powerful means to increase
socioeconomic equality and to promote their material interests.”®® In
other words, provincial socioeconomic development weakened party
loyalties and made class based political participation more attractive.
After all, “among the more modernized sectors of the lower classes
(especially urban) one observes a disenchantment with the conservative
economic policies of the JP and a growing interest in the left of center
Rpp ”70 -j-Q elaborate the RPP’s voting correlation with provincial
socioeconomic development, Dodd'’^  uses a socioeconomic analysis in
which he argues that in 1973 the JP did best in provinces with high rural
development, regardless of the level of urban development, whereas the
RPP did well in provinces with high urban development regardless of
®^ Ergun Ozbudun, Social Change and Participation in Turkey 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 174.
68 Ozbudun, “Turkey”, 347. 
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rural development. Then the question becomes whether the election 
results support these arguments. They in fact do;
As Ayata^^ points out, the biggest victory was in Trakya (Thrace). 
The RPP increased its voting at an average of 11.6 percent. Trakya was 
an agricultural region with more modern sectors of the peasantry in 
comparison to the rest of the country. Likewise, the increase in the 
Marmara and Mediterranean regions was 10 percent and 7.3 percent 
respectively. The RPP polled at an increasing rate in cities with over 
120,000 population \A4iile in those cities with over 400,000 population, it 
obtained about 40 percent of the votes cast. In Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, 
and Adana, the largest cities of Turkey, the average increase in the 
RPP’s voting was 12.25 percent. In some neighborhoods of these cities 
the RPP more than doubled its vote between 1969 and 1973. In the 
shantytowns of Istanbul, the increase of the RPP vote was 26 percent. 
The Republicans had received 21.8 percent of the votes cast in these 
low-income neighborhoods {Eyüp, Gaziosmanpaşa, and Zeytinburnu) in 
1969 and in 1973 they gained 47.5 percent. In Izmir, the support for the 
RPP had been 22.6 percent from the shantytowns in 1969. In contrast, it 
rose to 44.2 percent in 1973, marking a 21 percent increase. Moreover, 
the support for the Republicans increased in those areas with a high 
number of industrial workers such as Zonguldak. The increase was nine 
percent from the previous elections.
72 Ayata, CHP. 91.
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It is important to note that the RPP managed to siphon off Alevi 
(Turkish Shiites) votes from the Unity party, which accounted for a 7.7 
percent increase since the last elections. The Alevis are believed to 
constitute between 15 and 20 percent of the population and known for 
their traditional support for secularism in Turkey.^^ In this regard, they 
historically felt closer to the Republicans, zealous advocates of 
secularism in Turkey. However, with the emergence of the Unity party, 
the RPP had marginally lost touch with the areas of the large Alevi 
populations in eastern-central Turkey. There is evidence to conclude 
that as the Unity party declined following its parliamentary experience in 
1969, the RPP reaffirmed its position among the Alevis. As Ozbudun 
points out:
That the RPP substantially increased its vote in 1973 in the 
eastern-central region, where the Alevis are largely concentrated, 
suggests that a majority of the Alevi voters returned to the RPP 
fold after a brief experiment with their own party.^"
As mentioned earlier, in order to obtain a broader picture as to
how the RPP increased its vote in 1973, one must examine its new
policies in addition to the socioeconomic changes of the period. The
leadership had been changed prior to the elections, but the ideology still
remained the left of center. Was it simply the change in the party
leadership that made all the difference? Certainly not.
The RPP had moved to the left following the appearance of the
73 /«,
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Turkish Labor Party (TLP) in Turkish politics in the mid-1960s. Based on 
the potential of any fragmentation in either the left or the right, the 
governing-oriented parties that face a possibility of losing support among 
their strongholds tend to experience either a centripetal or centrifugal 
move dependent on the stance of the threat.^® The TLP had posed a 
threat to the Republicans in that the TLP could in fact appeal to the 
urban intellectuals \Atio then constituted the RPP’s traditional stronghold. 
“Thus, the TLP, despite its negligible size, did effect a switch from 
centripetal to centrifugal competition.” ®^ Accordingly, the 
pronouncements of the Republicans were rather radical and somewhat 
meant for understanding by the more educated. However, in 1973, the 
TLP, dissolved by the Constitutional Court, was no longer a threat to the 
RPP. “The centrifugal drive which had started for the RPP in the mid- 
1960s as a response to the appearance of the TLP on its left seemed to 
have stabilized, and the party settled on a distinctively moderate 
course.”^^  In this respect, there is significant difference between the left 
of center programs of the 1960s and those of the early 1970s. Although 
the left of center ideology remained secure going into the 1973 elections, 
it was not as radical as it had been in the late 1960s. This may also be
Ergun Ozbudun, “The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, 
Polarization, and Fragmentation” International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 17, no.2 (April 1981); 231.
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due to the fact that the RPP assumed a social democratic charter as a 
member of the Socialist International.
It was evident that the Republicans rejected elitism trying to move 
away from the tutelary and paternalistic posture of the past towards a 
people’s party image. Dodd conducts a survey of the Republican 
principles of the 1970’s and concludes that the RPP lead “great stress on 
the participation of the villages in their own development, of workers in 
their factories and civil servants in their offices.’’^ ® The pronouncements 
of the RPP were relatively moderate displaying a centripetal alignment. 
While frankly recognizing the existence of socioeconomic classes in 
society, it promised a welfare state and an assurance of class interests 
in a non-Marxist approach. Democracy and social justice were of utmost 
priority and restrictions on individual and group freedoms were to be 
lifted. Land reform was carefully elaborated to achieve a standard 
understanding that a working farmer should own enough land to make a 
living for himself and his family. The farmers, wealthy or poor, were 
promised that they would no longer be neglected. There was a 
remarkable effort to ensure that the content of the Republican program 
would not only address those with higher education, but also those with 
no education.
In this and in other respects, the RPP [had] learned that its chief rival’s [JP] 
ability to mobilize the electorate derives not just from the ’exploitation’ of 
ignorance but often from genuine helpfulness based on a closer understanding 
of the predicaments in which ordinary people often found themselves. The 
initiative from people was now all-important.
Dodd, Democracy. 113. 
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The Republican People’s Party managed to combine the 
ideological support with the aspirations and expectations of the urban 
low-income groups and of the modern peasantry in 1973. The 
socioeconomic changes of the period assisted a great deal in increasing 
the electoral appeal of the RPP. The results of the local elections held 
on December 9, 1973, confirm these arguments in that the RPP 
increased its vote to 39.5 percent and won 32 municipalities out of 67 
provincial capitals, including all of the four largest cities (Istanbul,
Ankara, Izmir, Adana) and those that traditionally had been the
80strongholds of the Democrats.
3.5. Canny Post-Election Negotiations: A Marriage of Convenience
The polarized parliamentary composition of 1973 with seven parties
represented in the assembly displayed an arithmetic that could only be 
resolved through negotiations. There were three basic solutions: a 
coalition government, a minority government or a national coalition. 
Influenced by the military authorities. President KorutCirk called for a 
national coalition. After all, any possible rightwing coalition could 
rekindle political extremism and violence once again .Despi te  all the 
joint efforts of the President and the military from behind the scenes to 
keep the politicians in line with the goals of the 1971 military ultimatum, 
the two major political parties did not subscribe to the reiterated calls for 
a national coalition. Consequently, negotiations to form a coalition
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government were long-drawn-out and very tedious. Finally, three 
months after the elections, the RPP and the NSP agreed to form a 
somewhat bizarre coalition. To many people, it was an incongruous 
union in that the Republicans were firmly secularist in tradition whereas 
the explicitly Islamic oriented Salvationists were intensely opposed to the 
principle of secularism in political life. The NSP’s ideology combined 
Islamist morals and values with strongly anti-socialist sentiments. 
However, the two parties shared some common attitudes as well as an 
interest in making an alliance. First of all, it would not be mistaken to 
argue that it was a coalition of convenience for both parties, provided 
that the parliamentary arithmetic was very complicated. The RPP had 
been out of office for quite some time and it was a unique chance for the 
Salvationists to enjoy the advantages of taking part in the government. 
Furthermore, as Sartori argues, as a religious party, the NSP could 
“freely float along the left-right dimension precisely because its identifiers 
[were] interested only in the religious payoffs of whatever alliance 
[paid].”“  Another way of explaining the underlying motive for such a 
union could be to argue that Islam and Socialism are not necessarily as 
incompatible as it may seem. Islam lays great emphasis on community 
and the general interest. Its care for the needy and advocacy for 
brotherhood promotes the principle of social security and welfare. Like 
social democracy, Islam rejects unrestricted capitalist enterprise; yet, it
82 Sartori Giovanni, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for 
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recognizes private property. “The desire to create a moral society is an 
Islamic as \A^ell as a socialist objective.”®^ Dodd®“* also believes that 
Muslim tradition would support a moderate socialism, which would not 
lean too much towards Marxism and libertarianism. Most immediately, 
both parties aimed to broaden the freedoms and liberties in the name of 
extensive social justice and to restore Turkey’s dignity and 
independence by avoiding commitment to the capitalist and imperialist 
western world. They both believed in the need for rapid and balanced 
economic development through domestic industrial and business 
impetus.®® Consequently, the two historically-alien parties prepared an 
ambitious coalition protocol which covered all shared issues of interest 
described above. Ayata®® argues that the coalition protocol was the first 
serious program that aimed to deal with problems of democracy in the 
country. As a matter of fact, the first thing the RPP-NSP coalition 
government accomplished was granting a general pardon (amnesty) for 
political prisoners and common offenders. It was the first step to 
establish a democratic society equal to that of the western world. The 
second issue on the agenda was the opium production. Although Turkey 
did not have a drugs problem and the opium production generated a 
substantial income, the American government, severely struggling with
83
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the use of hard drugs by the end of the 1960s, threatened to cut off 
financial aid to Turkey. Consequently, the interim government of Nihat 
Erim banned the growing of poppies under the increasing pressure of 
Washington in 1972. The decision was not only a serious economic 
blow to the peasantry in western Anatolia, but also an unpleasant 
subordination to the American government. It was the general perception 
of the people that the American national interests had dominated the 
Turkish ones. “This decision became the symbol of Turkey’s 
subservience to America’’®^ and the coalition government was determined 
to reverse the decision to restore Turkey’s dignity and independence. 
Two months after the government was formed, Ecevit allowed the 
cultivation of opium poppies in six provinces in western Anatolia, 
challenging the general loyalty to Uncle Sam. Despite the fact that the 
decision created American irritation, in the eyes of the vast majority of 
Turks, Ecevit had freed Turkey from imperialist ties and gained prestige 
as well as trust. Certainly, this was not the only case that placed Turkish- 
American relations on shaky ground. Ecevit’s popularity was also 
tarnished by his keen interest to “reorientate Turkish foreign policy 
towards Europe (the EC and the Scandinavian countries ruled by the 
socialists.)’’®® Furthermore, under the influence of Erbakan’s NSP, the 
government desired to have better ties with the Gulf countries. It was 
hoped that Turkish-Arab cooperation could lessen the impact of the oil
®^ Kedourie, Politics. 135. 
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crisis of 1973-74 on the economy. The efforts proved futile, for “Turkey’s 
industry was not export-oriented and there was little tradition of trade 
with the Arab peninsula.’’®®
The most serious crisis of foreign relations took place under the 
very same government. The Cyprus conflict had been a very 
complicated issue for previous governments in Turkey since the Greek 
military established a junta government in Athens in 1967. The Greek 
ambition of annexing the island flared up after Brigadier Joannides came 
to power in Greece in 1973. The military government of Joannides 
dismissed a federal solution of the conflict, rejecting the idea of Turkish 
co-islanders having equal status in a republic of Cyprus. Instead, it 
plotted a coup d'état to overthrow the Cypriot President Makarios on July 
15, 1974 and afterwards proclaimed enosis (union with Greece). The 
Treaty of Zurich in 1960, signed by three guarantor states (Turkey, Great 
Britain and Greece), had established a constitutional order and bi­
national republic on the island and the military coup meant the 
subversion of the Treaty. Consequently, Ecevit’s government called 
upon the other guarantor, England for joint action to restore the status 
quo and to rescue the rights of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots 
on the island. “However, the British Labor Government, professing great 
faith in the emollient and healing powers of diplomacy, absolutely 
refused to join Turkey’’®® against the subversion of the treaty by Greece
®®ZCircher, Turkey. 291. 
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through a coup d’état. The Turkish government was determined to act 
independently and show the rest of the world that Turkey would do 
anything to not only restore its self-determination on issues of national 
interests, but also to grant the mere right to the Turkish Cypriots to be 
free from Greek domination. It was a top-priority objective of the 
coalition protocol to reestablish Turkey’s dignity and self-determination in 
the international arena and this was a unique chance. Facing 
international pressure and possible isolation, as well as an American 
arms embargo, Ecevit sent the Turkish troops to the aid of the Turkish 
Cypriots on July 20, 1974. The second offensive on 14 August following 
the continuation of the communal violence came to an end partitioning 
the island with about 40 percent of the land under Turkish control. The 
military action authorized by the Ecevit and Erbakan coalition left a 
legacy of unresolved conflicts on the agenda of the foreign affairs for the 
ensuing governments, while ensuring the constitutional rights of the 
Turkish minority in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Zurich.
Military intervention greatly added to Ecevit’s stature and 
popularity. However, it also exerted a negative influence on the fortunes 
of the coalition. It became fairly clear soon after the intervention that the 
two-party coalition was coming to an end. There was always a factor of 
resentment and jealousy, as well as a competition as to who would reap 
the fruits of victories. The personal leadership rivalry and political 
complications burst to the surface following the soaring popularity of
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Ecevit. “Personal relations between the leaders broke down in 
September that year and so, a little later, did the government coalition.”®’
Ecevit resigned on September 18, 1974, while his popularity was 
still at great heights. “The leadership of the RPP ended its alliance with 
the NSP in the hope of either an early general election or a coalition with 
the Democratic Party.”®^ The RPP hoped for early elections in order to 
capitalize on Ecevit’s popularity over the Cyprus issue. However, the 
plans failed, for other parties, especially the JP under Demirel, did not 
intend to allow the RPP to savor an absolute majority in the parliament 
after an early polling and, hence, were determined to avoid cooperation 
with the RPP. Therefore, unfruitful negotiations lasted a long time. The 
failed attempts to form an RPP coalition were followed by various 
attempts to form a caretaker government.
On November 12, 1974, Sadi Irmak, a professor of medicine wtio 
had been a member of the parliament in 1943, was appointed by the 
President to form an above party administration. However, Irmak’s 
attempt to run such a dictated government came to an end \A/hen his 
administration failed to receive a vote of confidence in the parliament. 
Neither Ecevit nor Demirel would give support to Irmak’s cabinet, as they 
both wanted to exploit the present political turmoil to their own political 
advantages.®® Despite his resignation on 29 November, he had to
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remain in office until 31 March 1975, mainly because the party leaders in 
the Assembly could not come up with a government proposal. Turkey 
was in no state to continue without a government, for “it was a time of
sharpened economic crisis with inflation running at thirty percent. »94
3,6. The Nationalist Front Coalition: The RPP Out of Office
Eventually, at the end of March 1975, the JP under the aegis of Demirel
formed a coalition of the Right. As the JP did not win enough seats to 
form a government on its own and was likely to fail to win an absolute 
majority in the Assembly in early polling, it was forced to depend on the 
small parties of the right. After all, it was hoped that Ecevit’s popularity 
would diminish in time. Demirel lured small parties into this grand 
coalition by marked generosity in the award of ministerial posts. The 
nationalist front was composed of the Justice Party (JP), the National 
Salvation Party (NSP), the Republican Reliance Party (RRP) and the 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP), each having portfolios of sixteen, eight, 
four, and two respectively. All parties to the coalition made very efficient 
use of their governmental positions not only to “colonize the ministries 
they had been allocated by replacing existing personnel with those of 
their own political p e r s u a s io n , b u t  also to infiltrate important 
governmental agencies. The process of politicizing the bureaucracy was 
unrestricted and, as Heper argues, “never before in Turkish political 
development had the civil servants been shuffled in such an arbitrary
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fashion.”®® The question of whether these parties were actually
congruous in terms of their political ambitions, attitudes, and sentiments
can be answered succinctly by referring to Kedourie’s argument below.
The short-term opportunism and political ambitions constituted the
underlying motive for all the parties that made up the nationalist front
coalition, regardless of their political incongruity.
This kind of short-term opportunism practiced by all parties made 
the parliamentary and democratic politics an affair of 
combinaziones, ad hoc and pro tern, in \A/hich it is difficult to 
discern any principle except that of holding power for its own 
sake, and at any price.®^
Although the motives and the political attitudes of the coalition partners
varied in many issues, to the detriment of desired coalition harmony, they
all agreed on one major issue. It was:
What they saw as the very restrictive attitudes and even positive 
obduracy of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State, 
both of which continued to be regarded by the right as bastions of 
the [Republican] People’s Party mentality rather than as upholders 
of the values of the liberal and democratic system.®®
The nationalist front government, established to prevent a
possible RPP government and to provide political advantages to each
coalition partner, provoked ideological polarization not only in the
Turkish party system, but also in governmental institutions that regulated
the society. The civil service became an arena of political rivalry. As a
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direct result, “growing polarization was accompanied by increasing 
political violence and terrorism engaged in by small but well-organized 
groups on the extreme left and the extreme right.”®® The maintenance of 
law and order was seriously threatened as the police force grew to be 
politicized. Furthermore, the scarcity of foreign exchange and the high 
price of oil following the OPEC crisis in 1973-4 put the economy in the 
throes of increasing difficulties as inflation became uncontrolled. 
However, the nationalist front, too busy offering political awards to their 
supporters, did very little to stop the increasing political and social unrest 
in the country. “Political cleavages tended to politicize and reinforce 
dormant ethnic {Turkish versus Kurdish) and sectarian {Sunni versus 
Alevi) cleavages.” ®^® Blind and deaf to all political and social outcries, 
the coalition partners continued to capitalize on vote-catcher policies. 
The Republican proposal to lower the voting age to 18 and to provide 
health and unemployment benefits for all workers was considered a high 
vote-catcher and was soon adopted by the Nationalist Front. Moreover, 
reducing the price of artificial fertilizers was hoped to appeal to the rich 
landowners, who would bring along the votes of peasants in the 
countryside. Owing to these vote-catcher policies, “standards of fair 
competition fell significantly and there was a corresponding increase in 
politics of outbidding.” ®^^
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The partial Senate elections held in October 1975 was a 
harbinger of the 1977 general elections. The RPP increased its 
percentage of votes from 35.4 percent to 41.4 percent.’®^ The JP 
seemed to recover some of its losses in the 1973 elections at the 
expense of the small parties. The National Salvation Party and the 
Democratic Party sustained severe losses. The NSP, which enjoyed the 
greatest coalition potential, had done well in the share-out of the 
governmental posts by participating in two different coalitions. 
Nevertheless, the Senate election results represented an absolute 
setback for the NSP. It was not so surprising that the NSP lost its appeal 
in a country that relies heavily on its secularist reforms, especially when 
the JP seemed to regain its strength in the countryside. Likewise, the 
support for the Democratic Party, composed of the dissidents of the JP, 
seriously declined when the JP regained the strongholds of the 
traditional democrats who were previously displeased with the JP’s 
policies. The results of the partial Senate elections reaffirmed that 
Ecevit’s popularity was very high and the Republican appeal was on the 
rise. Consequently, “the nationalist front did everything to prevent early 
polling” “^  and lasted until the 1977 parliamentary elections.
102
103
Ayata, CHP. 93.
Ibid.
49
CHAPTER IV
THE RISE BEFORE THE FALL
4.1. Turkey and the RPP before the 1977 General Elections:
Going into the general elections in 1977, Turkey was faced with many
urgent social problems. Between 1970 and 1975, the population grew by 
2.5 percent with a 4.2 percent urbanization rate. Furthermore, from 1970 
to 1976, according to the World Development Report of the World Bank, 
the average growth rate per annum in agriculture and in industry was 4.9 
percent and 9.5 percent respectively. Both rates were nearly three times 
as much as those experienced in industrialized countries. However, the 
rapid population growth, together with unplanned urbanization, coupled 
with agricultural and industrial bloom, brought complicated economic 
problems. According to the State Planning Organization {Devlet 
Planlama Teşkilatı), the main goal was to attain a seven percent increase 
in National Income per annum. Even if this growth rate had been 
achieved in terms of income per capita, it would have still meant only a 
four percent annual increase, given that the population was growing at 
the same time at an average of nearly 3 percent .Fur thermore,  
between 1975 and 1977, the total of Turkey’s imports exceeded its 
exports total by 10.5 billion US dollars. Inflation became more
Cahit Talas, Türkiye’nin Açıklamalı Sosyal Politika Tarihi [A 
Detailed Sociopolitical History of Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 
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accentuated while the upsurge of unemployment was uncontrollable.
In the same peroid, the Nationalist Front Government borrowed seven 
million US dollars through high interest short-term loans.’“® 
Consequently, “short term, high interest loans, the printing of money and 
other specimens of financial mismanagement, occasioned by the desire 
to attract or reward supporters”’ “'’ caused the economy to come to the 
brink of a breakdown. It is significant to mention that one of the main 
reasons for “the economy [being] in increasing difficulties [was] the 
scarcity of foreign exchange and the high price of oil \A4iich OPEC had 
engineered in 1973-4.”’“® The outcome was the devaluation of the 
currency, major deficits in the international trade balance and successive 
increases in the price of goods and services with the attendant social 
unrest. In the face of the growing economic and social impasse, as 
Ahmad’““ points out, the members of the government continued to make 
statements falsely portraying a positive picture. The result, he 
concludes, was widespread pessimism and cynicism. Consequently, 
regardless of the name and nature of any future government, there 
existed two major problems to deal with, a collapsing economy and 
growing political polarization and violence.
’“® Schick, Türkiye. 72-73. 
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While Turkey portrayed a troubled picture before the 1977 general 
elections, were the Republicans trouble-free? Did they have any intra­
party conflict or were they absolutely harmonious? What sorts of re- 
organizational changes did the RPP have to undergo?
When Ecevit. assumed the leadership of the party in 1972, the 
common Republican desire was to reunite with the electorate. The 
majority of the Republicans firmly believed that the RPP had to refine 
itself through elaborating its political ideology and replacing its out-dated 
staff with contemporary thinkers. To what extent the Republicans 
successfully expounded on their political sentiments would be a matter of 
argument, as well as speculation. However, the RPP had staged a 
number of resignations and re-appointments since May 1972. To name a 
few, Kemal Satır, a top-level party member known to be İnönü’s close 
associate, resigned on 28 July 1972. Convened on 13 March 1973, the 
RPP’s group in the parliament decided not to participate in the 
presidential election, endorsing Ecevit’s motion. Disagreeing with the 
group decision, the Secretary-General, Kamil Kırıkoğlu, and 32 
Republican members of the parliament voted in the presidential voting. 
The disagreement was regarded as defiance of the party leader and on 4 
April 1973, Kamil Kırıkoğlu and the Central Executive Committee 
resigned.^’“ Following this chain of resignations, the Party Assembly 
elected Orhan Eyüboğlu, a close associate and strong supporter of
110 Hikmet Bila. CHP Tarihi [The History of the RPP] (Ankara; 
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Ecevit, as the new Secretary-General and re-established the Central 
Executive Committee.
4.1.1. The 1974 Statute Congress: The Revision of the Party By-law.
In the party congress of 28 June 1974, better known as the Statute
Congress {Tüzük Kongresi), the Republicans adopted new principles, 
which called for restructuring the party administration. The new statute 
changes aimed to structure the party organization in accordance with the 
social democratic nature representing the recent socioeconomic 
transformations. Moreover, they aimed to develop intra-party democracy. 
In other words, the new principles were adopted both to reflect the left of 
center ideology onto the party statute and to minimize the conflicts 
between the party’s General Headquarters and the provincial branches. 
Until then, complying with the Political Parties Law (Law #648, 13 April 
1965), the Republican People’s Party had two administrative bodies, the 
Party Assembly {Parti Meclisi) and the Central Executive Committee 
{Merkez Yönetim Kurulu). The Party Assembly was originally made up of 
40 members elected by the party congress. The Republican Party leader 
had a very influential position in the election process. The Party 
Assembly was the second highest decision-making body after the party 
congress. The Central Executive Committee was the executive organ 
responsible for carrying out the decisions of the party congress and the 
Party Assembly. It was also in charge of developing, strengthening and 
inspecting the party organizations throughout the country. It comprised 
the Secretary-General and 14 members.
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In accordance with the new principles, one-third of the leaders of 
the provincial organizations together with four representatives from the 
youth and women’s branches were admitted to the Party Assembly, 
bringing the number of its members to 67."^ Traditionally, the Party 
Assembly used to comprise the members of parliament who resided in 
Ankara, as well as the party elite who once played a role in party 
admin is tra t ion.With the increase in the number of members of the 
part assembly, the Republicans pursued the goal of “bringing the voice 
of Anatolia, the voice of party organization’’"^ into the decision making. 
It was an attempt to approach the party base and make use of the 
possible contributions of provincial branches.
Furthermore, the 47*^  article of the party statute of 1974 enabled 
the Party Assembly to supervise the Secretary-General and the Central 
Executive Committee. More importantly, the Party Assembly was given 
the authority to relieve the Secretary-General and the Central Executive 
Committee of their duty by the absolute majority of its members."" At the 
same time, the authority of the Central Executive Committee was
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strengthened by the articles 87 & 88, which provided the executive organ 
with the prerogative to determine the nominee candidates for the Grand 
National Assembly, Provincial General Assemblies (// Genel Meclisi), 
Mayoralties and Town Councils {Belediye Meclisi).^^^ All these 
organizational reforms were modeled after Western European Social 
Democratic parties, “particularly the Social Democratic Party of Sweden 
(SAP)”” ® The statute of the RPP had undergone a series of long-due 
changes in search for intra-party democracy and structural 
modernization. However, the advocates of these changes had perhaps 
overlooked the possibility of long drawn-out sessions to come to a single 
decision.
4.1.2. The 22"'* Ordinary Congress: Attempts to Enhance Intra- 
Party Democracy.
Just about five months after the Statute Congress, the RPP held its 
Ordinary Party Congress on 14 December 1974. The 22"‘‘ congress was 
very significant in that the change in the election of the Party Assembly 
system adopted then allowed the ossified disputes to emerge at a time 
the Republicans were practically least prepared to bear. The new 
election system required the provincial party leaders to choose the new 
members of the Party Assembly from five different lists prepared by the 
party leader, Secretary-General, women’s & youth branches as well as 
deputy group leaders. With the new system, staying neutral, the party
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leader would not use his influence in determining the Party Assembly 
members. The change aimed to democratize the Party Assembly 
election system.”  ^ There is no doubt that the change was ideal in 
philosophy; however, within the RPP, it was doomed to cause turbulent 
opposition. Chronically, any attempt to soothe the intra-party tensions or 
to enhance intra-party democracy within the RPP had created 
unintentional opposition by those Republicans whose privileges or 
standings were at stake. Moreover, the definition of democracy, or better 
yet justice, was so mercurial among the Republicans that any new 
principle or ideology was exploited in a way to maximize their own 
political ambitions. Consequently, conflicts of interest generated 
intransigent intra-party cliques that became the well-known characteristic 
of the Republican People’s Party. To elaborate, this good-willed change 
came to be perceived and hence utilized by the Republicans in a way 
that was least expected. It turned out that the result of the election of the 
new Party Assembly by the provincial party leaders excluded many 
members of the previous PA who were known to be close supporters of 
the party leader, Ecevit. As a result, creating a tumultuous opposition, 
those old members wbo failed to be re-elected expressed their 
resentment in Milliyet daily on 17 December 1974 as “the Party Leader 
should have had some influence or authority. He could have said ‘I don’t 
want these people in the PA’.” ^^® On the other hand, some of the
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provincial party leaders, vvho had been given the chance to determine 
the members of the new PA with the intention of enhancing intra-party 
democracy, took advantage of the privilege to the extent of individual 
negotiations to facilitate their political aspirations."® In the mean time, 
the party leadership of Ecevit was reaffirmed in the congress and the 
RPP set off with the same leader but with a renewed Party Assembly. 
The new composition of the Party Assembly changed the distribution of 
political influence and the balance of power among the rival groups 
within the party. It was apparent that the concomitant resentment with 
the changed status quo would yield increasing altercations, which could 
very well prevent the Republicans to carry on in accord.
In the early spring of 1976, it became apparent that the RPP had 
lost its harmony due to cliquishness within its ranks. Four major groups, 
which had disputing sentiments about the party’s future owing to the new 
distribution of intra-party influence, emerged. These were Deniz Baykal’s 
group, Ali Topuz’s group, the Pro-Headquarters group and the Left 
Wing.^^° Following the death of a member in the CEC, the competition 
among the rival groups to get their own candidates elected to the empty 
chair became uncontrollable. Bekta§^^  ^ argues that the underlying 
motive for the fierce rivalry was not due to a distinct conflict of opinion. 
Rather, it was a matter of balance of power within the party. After the
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election on 7 March 1976, the losing side composed of five members of 
the CEC, later known to be the 5s^ ^^  (5’ler), resigned marking the 
beginning of vehement disputes. From this point onward, on every issue 
ranging from trivial administrative procedures to general party policies, 
the RPP hosted a series of uncompromising groups of internal 
opposition.
Internal bickering and competition for power became so rampant 
in May that a general meeting was offered to discuss intra-party 
problems and to negotiate a common ground in order to “pursue 
contemporary politics.”^^  ^ There were severe criticisms that the party 
had failed to establish a successful organizational network and that it 
had lost touch with the social dynamics. In a sense, the party was losing 
touch with workers, small tradesmen, artisans and the peasantry. It was, 
in a way, ironic to point out that the party was neglecting the problems 
and desires of the social dynamics when, in fact, the party had been 
ignoring the ongoing disputes and breaches of harmony within its ranks. 
Could the RPP possibly deal with the problems of the electorate, when it 
failed to deal with its own problems? In other words, could the 
Republicans work effectively and come up with efficient policies when 
they lacked efficacy?
To many Republicans, the Party Assembly, with up to 70 
members, was not functional anymore and lacked the capacity to work in
122 Deniz Baykal, Haluk Ulman, Adil Ali Cinai, Tankut Akalın and 
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harmony and come to a decision on any issue. Ecevit was also of the
same opinion and, to that end, he wished to unite the executive and
decision making bodies into one single, ‘above-all’ organ. He believed
that the operational structure of the party organization was established in
a way that was prone to create internal disharmony. His declaration on 3
June 1976 in the Milliyet daily clearly portrayed his views on the structure
of the Republican party organization:
There exists a structure in our General Headquarters that is doomed to create 
estrangement. That is, the Party Congress elects the Party Assembly and that 
Party Assembly then elects the Central Executive Committee and the 
Secretary-General. However, from then on, the General Executive Committee 
and the rest of the Party Assembly become alienated from one another retiring 
to a distance... Furthermore, there is a question of estrangement between the 
General Headquarters and the party groups...The altercation between the 
General Headquarters and the party group is almost an eternal characteristic of 
the RPP.^ '^·
In this respect, İsmail Hakkı Birler, Turan Güneş, and Tarhan Erdem 
prepared a motion to make necessary changes in the party bylaw to 
replace the bicameral system with a central one.^ ^®
4.1.3. The 23'*^  Party Congress; The Invalidation of the Bicameral 
Administration.
The 23''* Ordinary Party Congress was held on 27 November 1976. The 
main agenda of the congress was meant to focus on the new party 
program and redesigned party statute. The party program was enriched 
to address the needs of the period in a more exclusive social democratic 
approach. The party statue, despite the fact that it had been modified just
123
124
125
Tartan, Son. 8. 
Bektaş, Liderler. 92. 
Tartan, Son. 63.
59
two years ago, was revised to help resolve the intra-party crisis and 
enhance the decision-making process. In spite of the agenda, “the 23'*^  
congress staged a competition for the General Secretariat.”’ ®^ The 
position of the Secretary-General traditionally had a crucial significance 
in terms of internal distribution of power within the RPP. Until this 
congress, the Secretary-General used to preside over the Central 
Executive Committee. If the majority of the CEC comprised those party 
members, who belonged to the group that the Secretary-General 
represented, then, the Secretary-General and, consequently, the group 
that he represented would be more effective within the party and would 
have more influence over the party organization than the party leader 
himself.Therefore, it was quite natural for the rival groups within the 
RPP to fully concentrate on acquiring the General Secretariat. The fierce 
competition among Orhan Eyuboğlu, Deniz Baykal, and Turan Güneş 
resulted in Orhan Eyuboğlu’s election for the Secretary-General.
Eventually, however, the motion, which covered the relevant 
organizational and administrative amendments, was brought forward and 
accepted. Thereafter, the RPP had a General Executive Committee 
{Genel Yönetim Kurulu) which possessed the powers of decision-making 
and execution. The General Executive Committee (GEC) was made up 
of 21 members. The party leader chaired the General Executive 
Committee along with the deputy group leaders and 16 other board
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members elected in the party congress. The Secretary-General was 
elected within the General Executive Committee by the absolute majority 
of its members. The Secretary-General would then select his four 
deputies and the general accountant of the party from the members of 
General Executive Committee, subject to the approbation of the party 
le a d e r .T h is  was, in a sense, a constraint on the authority and leeway 
of the Secretary-General. As Bekta§ suggests, the party leader, in 
accordance with the new statute, single-handedly possessed the sole 
authority directly presiding over the General Executive Committee, which 
held the ultimate powers of decision-making and execution. “This way, 
the powerful general secretariat became out of date, eradicating the 
aspect of a Second Leader.”^^ ^
On the other hand, by renouncing the bicameral system, the 
Republican People’s Party returned to the central organization model 
that it had used 25 years ago. The change in the hierarchy and 
delegation of administrative power was hoped to provide internal 
solidarity through lessening disharmony. Moreover, the Republicans 
organized special work groups in order to establish better 
communication and to foster cooperation with the social dynamics.
However, the Republican leadership was so occupied with their 
efforts to soothe the increasing tension within the party that they
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experienced unexpected trouble in determining their candidates for the 
parliamentary and senate elections. They had such difficulty with this 
that the RPP was almost excluded from the elections in 1977.^^  ^ It is 
important to note that the introduction of the General Executive 
Committee model was a serious attempt to increase the efficiency of the 
party administration at the expense of intra-party democracy. There 
existed no control mechanism to supervise the General Executive 
Committee and prevent any arbitrariness. If the party members and the 
General Executive Committee disagreed on an issue, then there would 
be no way of determining right from wrong, since there was no arbiter. In 
other words, there was no pre-planned process by which the two 
disputing sides would submit their differences to the judgment of an 
impartial group appointed by mutual consent or statutory provision. It 
appeared that the RPP with this new model was bound to face more 
serious internal conflicts in the ensuing days.
4.2. The 1977 General Elections: The RPP Emerges Triumphant
The results of the elections held on 5 June 1977 proved that in the eyes
of the electorate, the continuous quarrelling of the coalition partners of 
the National Front had overshadowed the internal turmoil of the RPP. 
The Republicans received 41.4 percent of the popular vote, increasing 
their share by seven percent since 1973. However, denying the RPP a
131 Tartan, Son. 24.
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sufficient base for a stable hold on power, “the right was able once again 
to frustrate Ecevit’s best hopes to form an effective government”^^  ^on his 
own. The RPP obtained 213 seats in the Assembly, coming very close 
to an absolute majority with 47.3 percent of the parliamentary seats (See 
Appendix A). In this election, the votes to the left of center reached its 
highest share ever, marking the triumph of the social democratic 
discourse. On the other side, Demirel’s JP also increased its polling by 
seven percent, gaining 39.6 percent of the votes cast. The JP in 
consequence obtained 189 seats, which constituted 42 percent of the 
parliamentary seats. In this regard, Dodd^^  ^ makes an interesting 
comparison between the two parties in terms of performance versus 
gains. He points out that the JP increased its parliamentary contingent 
by 40 since the 1973 elections through increasing its percentage of 
votes by only 7.1 percent. In the mean time, the RPP increased its 
percentage of votes by eight percent but surprisingly gained only 27 
extra seats.
Another interesting aspect of the 1977 parliamentary elections 
was that the combined percentage of the RPP-JP vote accounted for 
almost 90 percent of the popular vote and that Turkey was reverting to 
the two-party system (See Appendix B). Fragmentation, which was at its
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highest in 1973, fell considerably in 1977.’^  In 1977, the electorate was 
centrist, whether exactly in the center or just to the left or right to the 
center. A national survey, sponsored by the Turkish daily—Hürriyet and 
TOTEK—a technical consultant firm, was conducted in different regions 
among people of varying socioeconomic backgrounds on the 1977 
elections by a team of researchers under the co-direction of Üstün 
Ergüder and Selçuk Özgediz. The findings of this pre-election survey 
concluded that “26.8 percent of the respondents placed themselves at 
the [absolute] center, 27.7 percent left of center, and 24.6 percent right 
of center.”^^® It can be therefore inferred that “the electorate was 
distributed in a bell-shaped manner, with a single peak near the central 
point of the scale and the proportion declining rapidly as one moved from 
the center toward [extremes].”^^® Despite the increasing politicization of 
society and the end of consensus politics at the party level, the Turkish 
electorate had clustered around the center. Moreover, Özbudun argues 
that the tendency towards the two-party system was “distinctively 
stronger in the more highly developed regions of the country” and that
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“the combined RPP-JP vote [had] been positively correlated with the 
indicators of provincial socioeconomic development.”^^  ^ Although each 
party strengthened its parliamentary standing, neither gained enough 
seats to set up a government on its own. The NSP’s votes declined by 
three percent and it lost half of its parliamentary contingent, obtaining 
only 24 seats. As Ahmad’ ®^ suggests, this result proved that religion was 
not the most important factor influencing the voting behavior of the 
Turkish electorate. On the other hand, the Democratic Party and the 
Reliance Party practically lost their parliamentary relevance. However, 
the NAP substantially increased its share of the popular vote, almost 
doubling it, from 3.4 to 6.4 percent. What appeared more significant was 
that the NAP increased its parliamentary contingent from three to 16, 
more than fivefold. It is Ozbudun’s argument that “the NAP siphoned off 
votes from the JP and attracted a large number of new voters.”’®^
Confirming the analysis of the 1973 election results, Erguder 
presents the major findings of the 1977 pre-election survey as follows: In 
ecological terms (See Appendix c), 64.9 percent of the metropolitan voters 
favored the RPP. Therefore, the Republican vmte remained to be 
positively associated with urban population. Education proved to be 
another Republican identifier among the surveyed. 68.3 percent of the 
surveyed with either high school or university education identified
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themselves \vith the RP. Notably, 79 percent of the surveyed, who 
characterized themselves as undevout Moslems with pro-secular 
sentiments, classified themselves as RPP supporters. On the contrary, 
the identification with the JP was disposed to be stronger among the 
relatively more rural, less educated, and pious voters.
Moreover, the data on the occupational distribution of the party 
identification (See Appendix c) revealed that the fixed income groups, 
which comprise civil servants and workers, over^vhelmingly favored the 
RPP over the JP. While 71.8 percent of civil servants supported the 
Republicans, 67 percent of laborers identified themselves with the RPP. 
In addition, professionals, entrepreneurs and businessmen who would 
normally reside in urban areas favored the RPP at a reasonably high 
rate of 48.5 percent. On the other hand, confirming the traditional voting 
behavior, 47.6 percent of the countryside residents, namely peasants, 
favored the JP over the RPP giving the Justice party a leading edge over 
the RPP. "^  ^ The findings of the national survey corresponded to the 
argument that fixed-income groups, in spite of their diminishing financial 
standings, managed to cope with rapid industrialization and identify with 
the industrial working class. As a result, they denied the peripheral 
parties of any substantial electoral hold in 1977.
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>nd4.2.1. Uncompromising Negotiations for Government: The 2 
Nationalist Front.
Once again, faced with a stalemate, the latest parliamentary arithmetic 
made minority or coalition governments inevitable. However, if there 
were to be a coalition government, it would be a coalition of a major party 
with smaller ones. Unfortunately, it had been the traditional tragedy of 
Turkish politics that the major parties could not make an alliance to run a 
government of strong and legitimate support. They preferred to be an 
uncompromising and vociferous opposition. As a matter of fact, it was 
their leadership that had “not always shown a propensity for compromise 
and accommodation even in the face of a grave and imminent threat to 
the regime.” '^'^
To nobody’s surprise, engaged in endless futile bickering, Ecevit 
and Demirel could not form a coalition to maneuver Turkey out of the 
present multi-fold crisis. Unreasonably and perversely obstinate, both 
leaders acted as if they would simply ignore the 1977 May Day 
demonstrations in Istanbul, which resulted in 34 dead and many shops 
and cars destroyed.Turk ish political parties continued to take action 
in accordance with the interests of their party leaders, disregarding the 
national consensus to bring an end to the economic stringency and 
social violence.^ '^* Eventually, on 21 June 1977, Ecevit, having the
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largest number of seats in the parliament, attempted to form the minority 
government of Turkey with the support of the independents. However, 
his government, which Demirel called “an occupancy government,”’"® 
failed to receive the vote of confidence and, consequently, was forced to 
resign on 3 July 1977. On 21 July 1977, Demirel formed his coalition, 
granting prominent ministerial positions to both the NSP and NAP. This 
coalition government later came to be known as the Second Nationalist 
Front {2nd MC) in vvfiich the Salvationists and the Nationalists, in spite 
of their relatively poor electoral power, ended up with eight and five 
ministries respectively. The Second Nationalist Front coalition was 
doomed to be short-lived. Some of the moderate members of the JP 
soon found themselves in a state of sulky dissatisfaction with heavy 
reliance on and concessions made to the radical Islamists and the 
extreme right wing Nationalists in terms of ministerial posts.’"® The 
success of the Republicans in the Mayoral elections of 11 December 
1977 was the last straw for “a number of JP moderates, who [later] 
formed a group to urge coalition with the RPP.”’ "^  Despite the poor 
electoral performance in the local elections, Demirel insisted on keeping 
the Second Nationalist Front government, completely ignoring the intra­
party opposition and resentment towards the coalition members.
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Consequently, 11 members^"® of the Justice party resigned and 
supported the RPP in an interpellation against Demirel’s government on 
31 December 1977, which brought about the downfall of the government 
by 228 votes to 218.
4.2.2. The 3'*^  Ecevit Government: The Beginning of the End.
In the follovwng days, including the defectors from the Justice Party,
Ecevit managed to form a government, which depended on the combined 
support from the independents, the Republican Reliance Party (RRP)^'’®, 
and the Democratic Party (Dem.P)^^°. The 3^ *^ Ecevit government, better 
known as the ‘Government of the 11s {11'ler Hükümeti), received the 
vote of confidence on 17 January 1978.
It must be noted that there were many criticisms within the 
Republicans not only on including the dissidents of the JP within the new 
government, but also on giving them 10 newly created ministries. For 
instance, Ilyas Seçkin, an old deputy Secretary-General, was one of the 
many Republicans who objected to setting up a government with the 
defectors of the JP. Tartan reports that Seçkin complained to Ecevit in 
the presence of two deputy Secretary-Generals, Hasan Esat Işık and 
Mustafa Üstündağ, and said: “We cannot go anywhere with these men. I
148 The 11 dissidents from the JP were Cemalettin Inkaya, Tuncay 
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JJ 151know eight of them very well. They are individuals \Mio will harm us 
On the other hand, Ecevit saw it as a chance to contain the growing 
danger of fascism and to calm the increasing pressure from the party 
organization, which demanded a Republican government in power. 
However, with such a cabinet, it was out of the question for Ecevit to 
implement his party program. Consequently, he gave up on imposing 
radical measures and simply focused on efforts to bring peace and
order. 153
In addition to on-going difficulties in foreign affairs with Greece 
over the Cyprus issue and the extent of territorial waters in the Aegean, 
coupled with weakened relations with the US, Ecevit’s government was 
faced with a collapsing economy and terrifying political violence. Under 
these circumstances, Ecevit hoped to implement a moderate approach in 
relations with Greece, while reemphasizing the increased importance of 
firm and persistent attitude in foreign affairs. In order to cope with the 
deteriorating economic situation, he set forth a series of economic 
measures which demanded the economy to move “rather more towards 
the left by the promise of greater control over foreign oil and mining 
companies and of new land reform legislation.”^^ On the other hand, 
restoring balance to the economy required Ecevit’s left-wing government
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to search for foreign aid. Primarily, arrangements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were inescapable, forcing Ecevit to implement 
policies that in theory did not coincide with the Republicans’ political 
ideology. The IMF stipulated that the Turkish government had to 
execute expenditures-dampening policies and had to allow for the 
devaluation of the lira. Since the OECD had imposed the compliance of 
the IMF conditions for any possible external aid, Ecevit was left with no 
option but to accept the IMF’s regulatory measures. Leading the 
government of a country whose economy was on the brink of collapse, 
the RPP cabinet had to accept all conditions set forth by the creditors 
“on terms with which a left-wing government could not [normally] be in 
sympathy, simply in order to keep Turkey afloat.” ®^® In the aftermath of 
such compulsory undertakings;
Ecevit successfully negotiated, inter alia, loans from the World 
Bank during 1978 and 1979 totaling some 516.5 million US. 
dollars, standby arrangements with the IMF for some 327 million 
US. dollars and loans and credits by the Turkey Consortium of the 
OECD amounting to 961 million dollars.^ ®®
In the menacing case of growing political fury and bloodshed on
the streets, the RPP government did not enforce the strict preventive
measures that it did against the imminent breakdown of economy. Dodd
argues that Ecevit, with a humane mindset, was “convinced that terrorism
(at least from the left) derived from lack of economic opportunity.’’ ®^^
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Thus, it was believed that when the deteriorating trend in economy was 
averted, terrorism would be halted. However, it was crucially neglected 
that, even in the most optimistic case, economic measures would not 
harvest its returns in the short term. They were bound to prove gradually 
successful in the long term. In the absence of repressive policies, a 
number of serious violent public disorders led to bloodshed, placing the 
question of political violence on top of the agenda. It was particularly 
unnerving in Kahramanmaraş in southeastern Turkey between 22-25 
December 1978. The exacerbation of sectarian cleavages came to the 
fore in armed clashes between Sunnis versus Alevis, who favored the 
right and the left respectively, claiming 109 lives and leaving 176 
wounded and over 500 houses and shops vandalized.^®®
Once again, Ecevit was forced to impose policies, with which he 
did not fundamentally agree, which brought about martial law in thirteen 
cities. In spite of the grimness of the situation, Ecevit still sought clement 
handling of the martial law in respective provinces. The RPP, which 
assumed an anti-military stance in the 1970s, opposed any role for the 
military in politics. In this regard, Ecevit firmly demanded that “the 
martial law coordinating committee respected the government’s wishes 
when implementing decisions, and he himself sat on the committee.” ®^® 
Moreover, while still making a considerable effort to ensure impartial 
treatment towards political violence from both the left and right at the
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governmental level, in the face of propagated institutional politicization, 
the RPP government decided to carry out a cleansing operation against 
those administrators previously appointed by different political parties.^®“ 
It could be argued that the introduction of removing civil servants of other 
political persuasions was to ensure a more timely feedback of breeches 
of law and order to the government.
Nonetheless, as it can be presumed, in most business and military 
circles, the harsh economic and the mild anti-terrorist policies of the 
Republican People’s Party caused it to wear out its welcome. In terms of 
the business sector, the restriction on economy and the devaluation of 
the currency adversely affected investments and profits of many 
businesses of varying scale, generating a concomitant animosity toward 
the RPP. Furthermore, there was a shortage of petroleum and its by­
products (diesel oil, kerosene, and gasoline). Because the fuel-oil 
stocks were depleting, the government had put into practice the use of 
ration cards. The shortage of petroleum products brought about a heavy 
blow on agriculture and public transportation, which, in consequence, 
paralyzed both the rural and urban life. The restrictions imposed on the 
use of electricity, coupled with the shortage of foodstuffs including 
margarine, aggravated the social unrest and inflamed the dissatisfaction 
with the RPP government.’®’
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As for the military, Ecevit’s attitude and treatment of the military 
and his policies concerning military measures on political terrorism were 
regarded as a perturbing intrusion into the traditional running of the 
military. Any comment or policy that meant to constrain the political 
influence of the military was considered unacceptable.
4.3. The 24“’ Ordinary Party Congress: The Intra-Party Opposition 
Challenges the General Executive Committee.
Encouraged by the growing disquiet throughout the country, the RPP
intra-party opposition groups rekindled the internal altercations, 
vehemently criticizing the new structure of party organization adopted in 
the 1976 Statute Congress. While the party headquarters espoused the 
present structure, some of the strong characters of the party including 
Turan Güneş, Haluk Ülman, Deniz Baykal and Ali Topuz urged a re­
adoption of the system set out in the party statute of 1974.^“  These party 
elites and their representative groups all agreed that the Party Assembly 
had to be reestablished. Since the foundation of the General Executive 
Committee as the ultimate executive body solely responsible for 
decision-making, the General Executive Committee chaired by the party 
leader had not been subjected to any administrative supervision or 
sanctions. The opposition claimed that in the absence of the Party 
Assembly, the authority and functioning of the board was arbitrary, 
literally bordering on political tyranny.^®  ^ Therefore, the intra-party
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opposition went into the 24‘  ^Ordinary Party Congress on 25 May 1979 in 
the hope of changing the current party organization for the purpose of 
enhanced internal democracy.
The 24*^  Republican congress was very significant in that it was 
the last ordinary party congress and that Ecevit had defeated his 
opposition, reconsolidating his leadership. To elaborate, the motion for 
the amendment of the party statute prepared by the intra-party 
opposition was rejected by 769 to 571. The marginal difference was 
particularly important for it meant that the RPP was on its way to the 
verge of disintegration. Loudly declaring his firm stance against the 
united intra-party opposition, Ecevit was reelected by receiving 1218 
votes out of the 1347 party delegates. Furthermore, he single-handedly 
prepared the list for the General Executive Committee at his own 
discretion. One of the striking aspects of the list was that it was 
generally made up of new politicians who would conceivably be more 
loyal to the party leader. Ecevit was undoubtedly laying down the 
groundwork for a very influential party leadership.
4.4. The October 1979 Mid-term Elections: The Devastating End of 
the Republican Government.
The 14 October 1979 elections, which comprised the partial Senate 
elections and Assembly by-elections, marked the end of the RPP 
government. For one-third of the Senator seats and five vacancies in the
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Parliament, mid-term elections were held in 29 provinces. Demirel’s 
Justice Party obtained 30 out of 50 memberships in the Senate and 
gained five by-elections in the Assembly. It was without a doubt a 
devastating defeat for the Republican People’s Party. In two year’s time 
since the 1977 general elections, the RPP lost one-third of its previous 
electoral power, polling only 27.4 percent. The Republican votes had 
plummeted to its lowest-ever in 1979. Even in metropolitan centers, the 
RPP had suffered a 20 percent loss in votes. While the share of the 
Republican electoral portfolios was 58 percent in 1977 in the 
metropolitan cities, it dwindled to 37.9 percent in 1979.^ ®® Having failed 
to receive the vote of confidence from the electorate, Ecevit resigned as 
Prime Minister immediately.
Despite the absence of detailed studies on this election, Ozbudun 
points out a similarity between the number of people, who had cast a 
ballot in 1977 and yet did not turn out in 1979, and the loss of the 
Republican share of the total vote in 29 provinces (See Appendix D). He 
further concludes, “the fall in the RPP vote was most likely a result of the 
massive abstention of the RPP voters in order to punish the poor
performance of the Ecevit government „166
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4.5. The Last Republican Congress: Towards the End of 
Democracy.
In the aftermath of the crashing electoral defeat, receiving the support of
Orhan Eyuboglu, the ex-Secretary-General, the main intra-party
opposition groups (pro-Baykal’s group, pro-Topuz’s group and the pro-
left-wing groups) agreed to collaborate against Ecevit. Faced with
multiple criticisms, Ecevit summoned the 8*^  Extraordinary Party
Congress on 14 October 1979 to receive the confidence vote for both his
leadership and the General Executive Committee.^®  ^ However, under the
sweltering heat of the intensified attacks from the intra-party opposition,
the General Executive Committee resigned on 26 October 1979, leaving
Ecevit as the only target for the internal bickering. The 8*” Extraordinary
Congress commenced with Ecevit’s speech in which he relentlessly
criticized the cliquishness of the RPP;
In our opinion, the greatest harm [to the RPP] came from the intra-party 
opposition which passed the limit of bearable criticism. What is important is not 
to bring the party to power, rather to establish power within the party...If I 
remain as the party leader, my administration is not going to have the Party 
Assembly that dates back to the 1950s...Those friends, who hold the opinion 
that the absence of the Party Assembly had caused the [poor] election results, 
are fooling themselves. In the past elections, the Party Assembly existed, but
the result was still defeat. 168
Eventually, Ecevit was reelected as the party leader receiving the 
vote of confidence by 1341 yea, and 20 nay, with 4 abstentions. In the 
case of the election for the General Executive Committee, contrary to the 
24*” congress, there were two lists prepared by the general headquarters
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and the intra-party opposition respectively. Ecevit made it quite clear 
that if the opposition list had been elected, he would have left the party 
leadership. Playing his last trump card, he influenced the congress and 
consequently, the general headquarters’ list was elected by a slight 
margin of 723 to 6 0 4 . The result of the voting conspicuously displayed 
that the aggregate power of the opposition within the party had reached 
an authority-threatening level in that Ecevit had to manifest his influence 
as a last resort. No one could have thought that this was the last party 
congress of any kind. However, one could have predicted that with the 
drifting towards disintegration, the Republican People’s Party was not 
only diminishing its electoral support, but also ruining the last remnants 
of its internal coherence.
Following the resignation of the RPP government on 16 October 
1979, Demirel’s JP came to power as a minority government. This time, 
however, although the NSP and NAP were not taken into coalition, 
Demirel still had to rely on the support of the partners of the old 
Nationalist Front coalitions. This was to be the last democratic 
government of the decade, for a military coup d’état brought the political 
system to a halt on 12 September 1980. In a year’s time, all political 
parties were abolished and barred from any future political arena. The 
58-year undulating political adventure of the Republican People’s Party 
had come to an end on 15 October 1981.
169 Bekta§, Liderler, 99.
78
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The maxim ‘left of center’ was adopted shortly before the 1965 general 
elections by the Republican People’s Party as a slogan marking a 
fundamental change in the ideological rhetoric of the party. However, 
the timing of the adoption of such a new and controversial slogan stirred 
ideological debate among the Republicans, \Miich caused the electorate 
to believe that the RPP lacked ideological coherence. Consequently, the 
Republican road towards parliamentary majority was paved with 
frustration.
Until Ecevit became the party leader in 1972, the RPP staged a 
series of bitter and uncontrolled struggles for power between the 
conservative and progressive factions within the party. The ideological 
development within the RPP proceeded with significant internal 
confusion and disputes which, on the whole, rendered the function of the 
party difficult. With Ecevit hoping to discard the image of the party’s own 
past, the transformation of the RPP in image and character took place as 
a response to socioeconomic changes and long-neglected intra-party 
dynamics. The RPP shifted its party base to include the grov^ng working 
class, \A4iich had been underprivileged in the face of rapid 
industrialization and economic growth. This shift marked the political
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recognition of the social classes and their special interests. From this 
point on, the RPP implemented politics based on class appeals.
The results of the 1973 elections displayed a distinct shift in the 
composition of the Republican vote. The RPP had obtained an upswing 
of electoral hold with the support from mainly the urban poor, which 
made up the working class. The 1973 election was also significant in 
that, in its aftermath, the RPP was the first party to implement the politics 
of compromise when such a political practice was not yet accepted as 
the main trend of practical politics in Turkey. The end of the military 
interregnum had produced a precarious democracy that remained 
susceptible to the possibility of other military coups. The priority of the 
RPP, therefore, became the defense of the democratic system; that is, 
making democracy work rather than implementing full-scale social 
democratic policies.
In another aspect, the RPP differed from its European 
counterparts in that it did not enjoy the backing of united trade union 
movements. Because unions were weak, the conditions for the 
emergence of a genuine working class leadership were absent. 
Consequently, intellectuals or other middle class radicals dominated the 
labor movement in Turkey. Against a background of weak trade unions 
and the absence of a genuine working class leadership, the RPP could 
not stay on a purely social democratic discourse. Furthermore, “the 
social democratic parties of Europe emerged from embryonic and
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undifferentiated labor movements.”’’ “^ On the contrary, the RPP adopted 
a social democratic nature in search of political identification. There is 
no substantial evidence to argue that it pursed the statutes of social 
democracy as a continuation of the struggle for political participation and 
democracy.
The 1977 parliamentary elections marked the triumph of the 
Republicans at long last. The electoral law, however, was a major 
barrier to social democrat ascendancy, which added to the frustration 
and isolation of the party and became a major source of the growing 
suspicion of the parliamentary channel. Moreover, the rise of the RPP 
was as sudden and dramatic as its subsequent shift from its social 
welfare policies and recent electoral base. The most damaging 
consequence was the devaluation of the left of center line, the collapse 
of social democratic pronouncement in the eyes of the masses. Instead 
of the promise of social change, the electorate associated left of center 
politics and the RPP with austerity coupled with uncontrolled inflation, an 
unparalleled shortage in daily necessities, and the rising tide of extremist 
terrorism. The present economic situation forced the Keynesian hopes 
into the background and gave rise to the monetarist policies of austerity. 
Those policies worsened the position of the urban poor, who had been 
already living under precarious circumstances. The working class 
neighborhood had formed the center of gravity of the RPP during the
Lauri Karvonen and Jan Sunderberg, Social Democracy in 
Transition (Aldershot: Darthmouth Publishing Company, 1991), 33.
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golden years. Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the gecekondus’ 
support for the social democrats disappeared and with them the core of 
the social democratic support. Consequently, the electorate, dismayed 
by the poor performance of the Republicans, was left with no sensible 
reason for giving political support to the RPP. In a way, this was 
inescapable because despite strong attempts to reunite with the 
electorate, the RPP could not change its traditional character. It 
remained as an electoral machine. At the parliamentary and 
administrative level, it was completely dominated by civil servants, 
lawyers, and economists, in short, by layers of the upwardly mobile 
professions out of touch with or without any roots in the real life of the 
working class.
The turbulent 1970s had an untamed effect also within the 
echelons of the RPP. The ideological development and political 
realignment within the RPP were, at least in the early days, paralleled by 
a pragmatic and conciliatory attitude in restructuring the party 
organization and rearranging the balance of power among the 
Republicans. In an attempt to remedy the shortcoming, caused by 
preserving the cult of leadership and, thus, lack of intra-party democracy, 
the Republicans underwent a series of reformist changes in party 
administration and statute. However, personalistic politics rendered the 
overall benefits of good-willed reforms futile. Consequently, Ecevit’s 
charisma and power within the party and the maintenance of a 
centralized and often authoritarian party structure were hoped to curb the
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growing intra-party disputes. Oligarchical and centralizing tendencies 
had dominated the evolution of the RPP’s organizational structure. The 
crux was whether the Republicans themselves could forget the party’s 
past. Unfortunately, they could not prevent themselves from being 
besieged by historical bigotry. As Karpat once pointed out, within the 
RPP, “the initiative for action [was] normally expected from the top party 
hierarchy and therefore the spirit of obedience and the cult of leadership 
[was] preserved.’’^ A n y  attempt to foster intra-party democracy fell in 
despair because it was regarded as a sign of disloyalty vis-a-vis the 
leader. Furthermore, Ecevit’s personality and tendency to impose his 
interpretation of the party’s policies and establish a centralized 
authoritarian administration created deep divisions within the party. 
Moreover, the RPP could not let go of its unfortunate character of 
inherent contradictions in a language of self-destructive dichotomies, 
and the immature compartmentalization of the intra-party opposition.
The sociopolitical turbulence of the decade came to an end with 
the military coup of 1980. Nevertheless, the turbulence within the RPP, 
which is yet to be resolved today, could never be subsided because it 
was banned from politics in an unexpected and unfortunate manner on 
15 October 1981.
171 Karpat, Politics, 407.
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APPENDIX A
Votes and Seats won in Parliamentary Elections, 1950-1977 (in percentages)
Election
Year
Turn
Out D P /J P RPP NP FP NTP TLP NAP TLP
Dem. 
RRP Party NSP
1950.0 89.3 53.3 39.8 3.0 . . _ _
83.3 14.2 0.2
1954.0 86.6 56.6 34.8 4.8 . . _
91.6 5.6 0.9
1957.0 76.6 47.3 40.6 7.0 3.8 . .
69.6 28.7 0.7 0.7
1961.0 81.0 34.8 36.7 14.0 13.7 . .
35.1 38.4 12.0 14.2
1965.0 71.3 52.9 28.7 6.3 3.7 3.0 2.2
53.3 29.8 6.9 4.2 3.3 2.4
1969.0 64.3 46.5 27.4 3.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 2.8 6.6 . .
56.9 31.8 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.2 1.8 3.3
1973.0 66.8 29.8 33.3 1.0 3.4 1.1 5.3 11.9 11.8
33.1 41.1 0.0 0.7 0.2 2.9 10.0 10.7
1977.0 72.4 36.9 41.4 0.1 6.4 0.4 1.9 1.9 8.6
42.0 47.3 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.7 0.2 5.3
Sources: For the elections of 1950 through 1965, see 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 
Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üye Seçimleri Sonuçları [The Results of the National Assembly Elections 
of 1950-1965 and the Senate Elections of 1961 and 1964] (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet 
İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayını, no. 513,1966), pp. xxxvi-xxxvii; for the 1969 elections, see 12 Ekim 
1969 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları [The Results of the 12 October 1969 National Assembly 
Elections] (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayım, no. 610, 1970), pp. vi-vii; 
for the 1973 elections, see 14 Ekim 1973 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları [The Results of the 14 
October 1969 National Assembly Elections] (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü 
Yayını, no. 702, 1974), 6-7; for the 1977 elections, see Milletvekili Genel ve Cumhuriyet 
Senatosu Üyeleri Üçtebir Yenileme Seçim Sonuçları [The Results of the National Assembly 
General Elections and the Elections for Rene\wal of One-Third of the Senate Membership] 
(Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayını, 1977).
Note: The first figure refers to the percentage of votes and the below figure to the percentage of 
seats. Totals may not add to 100 because of the omission of independents.
Abbreviations: DP-Democrat Party; JP-Justice Party; RPP-Republican People’s Party; TLP- 
Turkish Labor Party; NAP-Nationalist Action Party; TUP-Turkish Unity Party; RRP-Republican 
Reliance Party; Dem. Party-Democratic Party; NSP-National Salvation Party.
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APPENDIX B
Fragmentation in Turkish Party System, 1950-1977; National Assembly
Elections (in percentages)
Elections
1950
1954
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
Votes won by 
strongest parties
93.2
91.4
87.9
71.5
81.6
73.9
63.1
78.3
Seats won by 
strongest parties
98.0
97.2
98.3
73.5
83.1
88.7
74.2
89.3
Fragmentation 
of votes
0.554
0.556
0.605
0.706
0.630
0.697
0.767
0.680
Sources: See sources in Appendix A.
Note: Fragmentation of votes is measured by Douglas Rae’s (The Political 
Consequences of Electoral Laws [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967], 56) “index of 
fractionalization,” which is written as follows: Fo = 1- (S"T^) i=1. In this formula, derived from 
probability statistics, T  is equal to any party’s decimal share of the vote. Thus in a perfect one- 
party system, Fo equals zero: the more the vote is dispersed among competing parties, the more 
Fc approaches, but never reaches, one. Under a perfect two party system (i.e.’ a 50-50 split), Fc 
equals 0.5. The model is sensitive to both the number and the relative equality of the party 
shares.
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APPENDIX C
PRE-ELECTION SURVEY, 1977
1. Party Identification by Population Size (in percentages)
Population
Parties
Metropolitan
Areas
Cities of 
10,000-50,000 
Population
Rural
Areas
JP 23.6 36 41.7
RPP 64.9 50.5 41.7
Minor Parties 11.5 13.5 16.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
2. Party Identification by Occupation (in percentages)
" \ O c c u p a t i o n
Parties\.^
Civil
Servants Farmers Workers
Small
Traders Housewives Others*
JP 10.6 47.6 21.2 37.2 38.4 35.3
RPP 71.8 36.8 67.1 43.1 44.1 48.5
Minor
Parties
17.6 15.6 11.7 19.7 12.5 16.1
Total 100 100 100 100 95 100
"Includes professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen.
Source: Üstun Ergüder, “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behavior in Turkey” (Paper presented at 
the Eleventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Moscow, Russia, 
August 12-18,1979).
89
APPENDIX D
Electoral results in twenty-nine provinces, 1977 and 1979
1977 1979 Difference
Registered Voters 9,499,563 8,160,002 -1,339,561
Number who voted 6,936,279 5,811,276 -1,125,003
turnout (percent) 73.0 71.2 -1.8
tota l valid votes 6,700,92 5,666,464 -1,033,628
Justice Party 2,467,414 2,710,795 243,381
Votes (percent) 36.8 47.8 11.000
Republican People's 
Party
2,722,454 1,655,542 -1,066,912
Votes (percent) 40.6 29.2 -11.400
Democratic Party 122,085 N/A 122,085
Votes (percent) 1.8 - N/A
National Salvation 
Party
595,444 534,083 -61,361
Votes (percent) 8.9 9.4 0.5
National Action Party 354,428 364,668 10,240
Votes (percent) 5.3 6.4 1.1
Extreme Left* 40,122 203,339 163,217
Votes (percent) 0.6 3.6 3.0
Source: Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], no. 16803, (Ankara;Prime Minisrty, November 8,1979)
Note: The 1977 figures are for the 29 provinces where partial elections were held in 1979. They 
do not agree, therefore, with the general results of the 1977 elections. Percentages may not add to 
100 because of the omission of the independents.
♦Total of Turkish Unity Party and Turkish Labor Party in 1977; total of Turkish Unity Party, 
Turkish Labor Party, Turkish Socialist Labor Party, and Social Democratic Part}' in 1979.
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